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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Rep. Vol. 9 2002). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction subject to 
assignment by the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
First Issue (Causation) 
Whether the trial court erred in its Findings of Fact on causation that: 
(A) "The only facts concerning causation or the mechanism of injury in the instant case 
that may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses by a lay witness are that Linda Fox was 
descending the stairs and she fell. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 918, 916, 
110.) 
(B) "No lay witness can, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's senses, testify that 
whether the fall of Linda Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical condition of 
Linda Fox's knee." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 918, 916, flO.) 
(C) "Linda Fox fell without physical intervention of any actor." (Findings of Fact, 
Record, t i l . ) 
(D) "No person inspected the stairs after Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine the 
condition of the stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell." (Findings of Fact, Record 915, 
113.) 
(E) "Plaintiffs do not know which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell" 
(Findings of Fact, Record 916, % 14.) 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
First Issue (Causation) 
The standard of review when considering on appeal the Findings of Fact of a trial court is 
the clearly erroneous standard. "To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings of fact, 
an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. See, e.g., Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 390, 360 
P.2d 176 (1961); Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P.2d 815 (1981); Kohler v. Garden City, Utah, 
639 P.2d 162, 165 (1981); Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 743 
(1982)." Scharfv. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985). 
Issue Not Preserved in the Trial Court. Mr. and Mrs. Fox claim that the Findings of Fact 
set forth above were in error and that Mr. and Mrs. Fox preserved that issue in the trial court. 
They did not. As to the paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (designated 
as paragraph A, above) nothing in the Transcript of the Bench Trial contains a representation that 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox would present evidence concerning causation or the mechanism of injury that a 
lay witness would be able to, with the ordinary use of the senses, determine more than that Linda 
Fox was descending the stairs, and she fell (R. 924). 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue set forth in paragraph B, above, in the trial 
court. The transcript (R. 924) contains no representation that testimony would be adduced that a 
lay witness could, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's senses, testify whether the fall of Mrs. 
Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical condition of Mrs. Fox's knee (R. 924). 
As is set forth below, the Record is replete with verification of Mrs. Fox's pre-existing, 
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symptomatic medical condition. This appears in the uncontested portions of the Findings of Fact 
where the Court found: that Mrs. Fox had been told by Dr. Richard Jackson that Mrs. Fox would 
require a future knee replacement (R. 917, P ) ; in the Spring of 2003, Dr. Richard Jackson had x-
rayed Mrs. Fox's right knee and reported to her that her right knee was missing cartilage and 
diagnosed Mrs. Fox with an arthritic knee (R. 917, f4); prior to the April 20, 2004, fall, Mrs. Fox 
had some cartilage missing in her right knee due to osteoarthritis (R. 916, ^6); before her fall on 
April 20, 2004, Mrs. Fox reported having pain on the lateral side of her right knee; (R. 916, Tf7); 
and prior to Mrs. Fox's fall on April 20, 2004, Mrs. Fox was diagnosed with having some joint 
space narrowing in her right knee (R. 916, f 8). 
The issue of whether Mrs. Fox fell without physical intervention of any actor (paragraph 
C, above) was not preserved as an issue in the trial court. There is nothing in the record that 
indicates or references any third party who in some way intervened to cause Mrs. Fox to fall. 
Brigham Young University (BYU) cannot cite to the record in this instance because there is no 
portion of the record that would reflect the absence of this information. 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve as an issue in the trial court whether or not a person 
inspected the stairs after Mrs. Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition of the stair Mrs. Fox 
was on when she allegedly fell (paragraph D, above). Mr. Fox represented to the trial court that 
two days after Mrs. Fox fell, he examined the stairway and took photographs to show the general 
deterioration of the stairs. u[Mr. Fox] took photographs of the stairs not knowing exactly where 
[Mrs. Fox] had fallen." He further represented that after Mrs. Fox was released from the 
hospital, about three weeks later, they went to the stairs and found that the stairs had been 
completely rebuilt. (R. 924, p. 19, lines 3-13). 
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Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve in the trial court the issue that "Plaintiffs did not know 
which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell" (paragraph E, above). As is set forth in 
the immediately preceding paragraph of this brief, when Mr. Fox went to the stairs, he did not 
know exactly where Mrs. Fox had fallen (R. 924, p. 19, lines 8 & 9). Mrs. Fox testified in an 
affidavit that she did not know the exact location where she fell (R. 316, ]f21). 
Second Issue (Conclusions of Law) 
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that: 
(A) "... the Plaintiffs had no witness who could testify as to the condition of the stairs and 
had no witness who could testify as to whether or not the stairs were dangerous ..." (Conclusions 
ofLaw,R.,p. 915, fl) . 
(B) "The Plaintiffs' determination that they would call no expert witnesses on any 
subject, including but not limited to: a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and b. Linda Fox's 
medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 29, 2004; precluded evidence that 
Linda Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, 
knee which had loss of cartilage." (Conclusions of Law, R. 915, |2). 
(C) "In the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether Mrs. Fox fell 
because of her symptomatic, pre-existing condition as described above or for some other cause, 
the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proof as to causation." (Conclusions of Law, R. 914, 
TO. 
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(D) "In the absence of any healthcare provider who could opine as to the reasonable 
necessity of any healthcare received by the Plaintiff Linda Fox, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their 
burden of proof as to damages." (Conclusions of Law, R. 914, f5). 
(E) "Joseph R. Fox's claim is for loss of consortium. Because Linda A. Fox cannot 
sustain her burden of proof as to causation nor as to damages, the Plaintiff Joseph R. Fox's claim 
for loss of consortium fails." (Conclusions of Law, R. 914, [^6). 
The standard of review for Conclusions of Law is that Conclusions of Law are reviewed 
by the Appellate Court for correctness. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Issue Not Preserved in the Trial Court. Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the Second 
Issue (Conclusions of Law) in the trial court. 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether or not they had a witness who 
could testify as to the condition of the stairs and whether or not the stairs were dangerous. Mr. 
and Mrs. Fox stipulated the case would be tried without any expert of any kind including an 
expert on causation/mechanism of injury. (R. 917, f2(a)). Furthermore, as is set forth above, 
both Mr. and Mrs. Fox said they did not know the location of where Mrs. Fox allegedly fell (R. 
R. 316, f21). Without knowing the location where Mrs. Fox allegedly fell, no witness could 
testify as to the condition of that stair. 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether or not Mrs. Fox's fall was or was 
not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had a 
loss of cartilage (paragraph B, above). Mr. and Mrs. Fox stipulated that they would have no 
expert witness. There is no representation that Mr. or Mrs. Fox were prepared to call any witness 
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who, on their own, could testify that Mrs. Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-
existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had a loss of cartilage. Mr. and Mrs. Fox did 
not provide to the court any statutory or case law which would have sufficiently alerted the court 
to a contrary legal position. (R. 924). 
The issue of whether, in the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether 
Mrs. Fox fell because of her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee 
which had a loss of cartilage as described above, or for some other cause, Mr. and Mrs. Fox 
could or could not sustain their burden of proof as the causation was not preserved in the trial 
court. There is no citation by Mr. or Mrs. Fox to any statutory or case law that was presented to 
the court during the November 14, 2006, bench trial to support their side of this proposition (R. 
924). 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether, in the absence of any healthcare 
provider who could opine as to the reasonable necessity of any healthcare received by Mrs. Fox, 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox could or could not sustain their burden of proof as to damages. Mr. and Mrs. 
Fox were, apparently, prepared to testify that they received certain bills allegedly arising out of 
Mrs. Fox's alleged injuries, and this was preserved on the Record (R. 924, p. 16, lines 23-25). 
There is nothing in the Record td the effect that Mr. or Mrs. Fox could opine as to the reasonable 
necessity of the healthcare, nor the reasonable value of the bills. 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not preserve the issue of whether or not Mr. Fox's claim for loss of 
consortium would fail if Mrs. Fox could not sustain her burden of proof as to causation and as to 
damages. Mr. and Mrs. Fox did not argue the loss of consortium issue to the court (R. 924, 
Index, Sheet 2, second column (the word "consortium" does not appear in the transcript)). 
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Third Issue (Validity of UCA § 78-27-33, as amended). 
Whether the trial court was correct in holding that UCA §78-27-33, as amended, was 
impliedly repealed and was unconstitutional on its face as being inconsistent with Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) and Rule 803(4). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE AND RULE 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
The constitutional provision, statute and rule whose interpretation may be determinative 
of this appeal is set forth below. They are determinative only of the Third Issue presented by Mr. 
and Mrs. Fox. 
A. Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court 
- Judges pro tempore - Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by the constitution, the Supreme Court 
by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United 
States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court 
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and 
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
B. 78-27-33. Statement of injured person - When inadmissible as 
evidence. 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written or 
oral, obtained from an injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while 
this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of injuries sustained 
-7-
in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a person whose interest is 
adverse or may become adverse to the injured person, except a peace officer, shall 
not be admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding brought by or against the 
injured person for damages sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless: 
(1) a written verbatim copy of the statement has been left with the injured 
party at the time the statement was taken; and 
(2) the statement has not been disavowed in writing within fifteen days of 
the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of the injured 
person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which the person has 
been confined, whichever date is later. 
Utah Court Rules 
C. Preliminary Note 
On October 7, 1977, at the request of the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah State Bar 
Commission established a special committee to examine whether the Federal 
Rules of Evidence should be adopted by practice before the courts of the State of 
Utah. The committee was composed of Parker M. Nielson, Chairman, the 
Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, Professor Ronald N. Boyce, Professor Edward L. Kimball, 
Ramon M. Child and Stephen B. Nebeker. Ronald J. Yengich and Virginius 
Dabney were subsequently added to the committee. 
The Committee met pursuant to the foregoing appointment, and recommended 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the Superior Court pursuant to the 
general judicial powers contained in the Constitution of the United States. Article 
VIII, Section 1 to supervise inferior courts, and pursuant to the statutory 
rulemaking power of the Supreme Court contained in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2-4 (1953). It was the view of the Committee that, while the 
legislature many not enlarge judicial powers beyond those prescribed by the 
Constitution of Utah, Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 104 Pac. 760 (1908), the 
power to promulgate rules is within the general judicial powers conferred by 
Article VIII, Section 1. Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules, if and 
when these rules are adopted by the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed. 
The effort in proposing these rules, as with the Federal Rules of Evidence on 
which they are based, is not to codify the law of evidence, but to formulate guides 
from which the law of evidence can grow and develop. These rules therefore 
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supply a fresh starting place for the law of evidence and do not present an ultimate 
end. 
The numbering and test of these rules conform to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as promulgated by the Congress of the United States, effective July 1, 1975; 
except (1) where modifications of the text were made necessary by the fact that 
these rules govern state rather than federal proceedings and (2) in a small number 
of instances in which the rule adopted was considered sufficiently superior to the 
federal rule to justify departure from the objective of uniformity between Utah and 
federal rules. Where such modifications have been necessary, numbering 
consistent with the Federal Rules has been maintained. Unless modified, 
reference to the notes of the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is pertinent to the meaning and effect of these rules, together with notes 
of the Advisory Committee to these rules. 
"The issue of 'whether a statute is constitutional' is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, p. 30, 40 
P.3d 611; see also State v. Kell, 2002 UT 19, p. 50, P.3d 1019; Grand County v. Emery County, 
969 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, to the extent we are making a determination of a 
statute's constitutionality, the "statute is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality.'" Utah Sch. Bds. Ass 'n v. State Bd. ofEduc., 2001 UT 2, p. 9, 
17 P.3d 1125 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Daniels, 2002 UT 2 at p. 30. Grand 
County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57; 52 P.3d 1148 (Utah 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Mr. and Mrs. Fox allege that Mrs. Fox was injured on April 20, 
2004, when she fell on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center 
(hereunder "the stairs") as she descended the stairs. (R. 917, %l9 see also R. 740 & 739, |8). Mrs. 
Fox sought recovery for special and general damages she allegedly suffered on April 20, 2004. 
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(R. 37-31). Mr. Fox, a disbarred attorney (R. 782, f 5 and R. 776 "Order"), sought to recover for 
loss of consortium (R. 32 and 31,131). BYU denied it was liable to either Mr. or Mrs. Fox. (R. 
171-169). 
Disposition in Court Below. On December 12, 2006, the Court below entered a "Judgment of 
Dismissal with Prejudice" (R. 921-919). The Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice was based 
upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered December 12, 2006 (R. 913-912). In 
general terms, the Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law determined that because: the Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case 
without any expert witness of any kind on any subject; Mrs. Fox had a symptomatic, pre-existing, 
osteoarthritic, joint narrowing knee; and that there would be no testimony that anyone had 
inspected the stairs after Mrs. Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition of the stair Mrs. Fox 
was on when she allegedly fell; that the Plaintiffs could not sustain their burden of proof as to 
causation nor as to damages. Because Mrs. Fox's claim failed, Mr. Fox's claim for loss of 
consortium also failed (R. 913-912). On December 12, 2006, the Court also entered an Order 
Denying Plaintiffs' Objections to the Testimony of Noah Converse and Scott Starr, with 
Accompanying Exhibits. Mr. and Mrs. Fox's objection was based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
33, a statutory rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if enforceable, would make 
statements of an injured person inadmissible as evidence in a civil proceeding (R. 911-906). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox allege that Mrs. Fox was injured on April 20, 2004, when she fell on 
the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the stairs") as 
she descended the stairs (R. 917, Tjl; see also R. 740 & 739, f 8). Mrs. Fox does not know the 
exact location where she fell. (R. 316, f 21). During oral arguments Mr. Fox conceded that he 
did not know exactly where Mrs. Fox had fallen either (R. 924, p. 19, lines 8 & 9). 
While Mrs. Fox was being attended to by the emergency medical services (EMS) 
personnel on the stairs, Mrs. Fox reported to them: 
(A) there was no cartilage in her knee due to arthritis; 
(B) her knee went out as she was going down the stairs; 
(C) she fell down only one stair; 
(D) her knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs and she did not hold 
BYU responsible; and 
(E) that the stairs where she fell are too narrow and have always been dangerous. (R. 
739,1J11). 
The emergency medical services personnel did not observe any loose metal nosings on 
the stairway where Mrs. Fox fell on April 20, 2004. (R. 738, f 15). Where Mrs. Fox fell is 
consistent with a knee that gave out and inconsistent with someone who tripped and fell. (R. 738, 
If 17). While being treated by the emergency medical services personnel, Mrs. Fox self reported 
as part of her past medical history that she had arthritis in her right knee (the leg that was injured) 
and she further self reported that her knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs. 
(R. 737, f20). Mrs. Fox was transported in a van supplied by BYU to the Utah Valley Regional 
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Medical Center by the emergency medical services personnel. (R. 737, ^19). Upon arrival at the 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox and her son noted that on April 19, 2004, they 
were talking and had expressed surprise that Mrs. Fox had not had a serious problem or injury 
with her knee. (R. 737, ^ fl9). Approximately one year prior to her fall, Mrs. Fox had been 
examined by Dr. Jackson for pain in her right knee. (R. 755, ^ [2). Dr. Jackson reported that Mrs. 
Fox had arthritis in the knee and was missing some cartilage. (R. 755, f2). Dr. Jackson reported 
that Mrs. Fox, at some time in the future, would probably have to have her knee replaced but that 
she should put off the replacement as long as possible. (R. 755, f2). 
After arriving at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox reported to Dr. Douglas 
C. Murdock that at BYU while going down stairs, her right knee suddenly gave out and she 
collapsed down to the ground falling down some steps. She landed on that same knee and had a 
lot of discomfort and pain in that localized region. (R. 751, under "History of Present Illness'9). 
That same day and while still at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox reported to 
Dr. Jonathan R. Faux that while on the stairs at BYU, her knee gave out from underneath her in a 
varus type deformity and further reported that she had pain in the knee mostly on the lateral side 
prior to this and had a diagnosis of osteoarthritis and had joint space narrowing. (R. 747, under 
"History of Present Illness"). In April, 2004, Mrs. Fox's Admission Diagnosis, and Discharge 
Diagnosis, were: (1) right tibial plateau fracture; and (2) lateral compartment knee degenerative 
joint disease. (R. 744, under both Admission Diagnosis and Discharge Diagnosis). 
At the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, Mrs. Fox had surgery on her leg and had a 
fixator installed. (R. 924, p. 15, lines 20-22). Mrs. Fox is not qualified to say what was done to 
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her other than to say that a fixator was installed on her leg. (R. 924, p. 15, lines 23-25 and p. 16, 
line 1). 
Course of Proceedings. This matter was scheduled for a bench trial on November 14, 
2006. The Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case without any expert witness of any kind on 
any subject, including but not limited to: (a) causation/mechanism of injury; and (b) Mrs. Fox's 
medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 20, 2004. (R. 917, f2), 
Prior to trial, the Defendant had taken the trial testimony of the emergency medical 
services personnel (Noah Converse) attending Mrs. Fox immediately after she fell. (R. 853-852 
and R. 857-856 and R. 924, p. 44, line 12 through p. 47, line 6). 
The Plaintiffs objected to the admission of the trial testimony of Mr. Converse, taken 
before the trial, and the admission of the emergency medical services reports that would recite 
the statements of Mrs. Fox made on the stairs to the emergency medical services personnel on 
April 20, 2004, the substance of which are set forth above and come from R. 739, f 11, a-e, R. 
738, f 15 & 17, and R. 737, f 19 & 20. The Plaintiffs sought to exclude that evidence based upon 
a foundational objection claiming that under §78-27-33 an injured person's statement cannot be 
admitted into evidence unless a written verbatim copy of the statement had been left with the 
injured party at the time the statement was taken; and the statement had not been disavowed in 
writing within 15 days of the date of the statement or within 15 days after the date of the injured 
person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium in which the person has been confined, 
whichever date is later. (R. 924, p. 46, lines 19-25 and p. 47, lines 1-13). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First Issue (Causation) and Second Issue (Conclusions of Law) 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox have failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings as required by Scharf, supra. Mr. and Mrs. Fox have also failed to preserve this issue in 
the trial court as required by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(5)(A). 
The causal relationship between an injury and the subsequent need for surgery is an issue 
requiring expert medical testimony. A plaintiff alleging such a causal relationship bears the 
burden of proving proximate cause and can only do so by presenting expert medical testimony 
establishing the probability of such a connection. Mr. and Mrs. Fox stipulated that there would 
be so such testimony. Furthermore, no one inspected the stairs after Mrs. Fox's alleged fall and 
Mrs. Fox does not know which stair she was on when she fell. Therefore, Mrs. Fox could not 
testify as to what the negligent condition of the stair was upon which she fell. Further, there was 
no expert to testify whether the condition of Mrs. Fox's knee or the condition of the stair was the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Fox's fall. 
Third Issue (Validity of Utah Code Ann., 78-27-33, as amended) 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox objected to testimony of the emergency medical services personnel 
who attended her on the stairs on April 20, 2004. Mr. and Mrs. Fox's objection was based upon 
Utah Code Ann., §78-27-33, a statutory rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if 
enforceable, would make statements of an injured person inadmissible as evidence in a civil 
proceeding. Mr. and Mrs. Fox allege that the conditions set forth in the statute apply. For the 
purpose of the trial court's order, the court assumed that the conditions set forth in the statute 
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existed. The trial court denied Mr. and Mrs. Fox's objection because the statute was 
unconstitutional pursuant to the Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, quoted above, 
and as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in its September 10, 1985, per curiam order filed 
September 10, 1985, also quoted above, and further augmented by the Preliminary Note to the 
Utah Court Rules quoted above. This statutory rule of evidence is inconsistent with and is 
superceded by Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) and 803(4). 
ARGUMENT 
First Issue (Causation) 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox asked this Court to find that the trial court erred in entering the 
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 10, 11, 13 and 14. Paragraphs 10, 13 and 14 of the Findings of Fact 
recite the Court's decision that, although Mrs. Fox was descending the stairs and fell, that no one 
inspected the stairs where Mrs. Fox fell to determine the condition of the stair on which she fell. 
The Court further determined that the Plaintiff did not know which stair Mrs. Fox was on when 
she allegedly fell. Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence prohibits Mrs. Fox from testifying 
where she fell and the condition of the stair. It states, in its entirety: 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence 
to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own 
testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion 
testimony by expert witnesses. (Amended effective October 1, 1992). 
Because Mrs. Fox does not know where she fell and because she did not have anyone 
who was able to inspect the stair, she could not testify that the condition of the stair caused her 
fall. Without knowing the condition of the stair, there could be no finding of fact that the stair 
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was defective. This is particularly so in light of Mrs. Fox's symptomatic, pre-existing, 
osteoarthritis, joint narrowing, knee that had loss of cartilage. Without someone to testify how 
the stair condition could have caused Mrs. Fox to fall, there could be no plausible evidence that a 
defective stair caused her to fall. Without such a defective stair, there could be no proximate 
cause. 
While proximate causation is generally an issue for the jury, a trial court may rule 
as a matter of law on the issue if: "'(1) there is no evidence to establish a causal 
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable 
persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on 
proximate causation."' Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 
P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1991), affd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)). Bansasine v. 
BodelU 927 P.2d 675, at 676 (Utah App. 1996). 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox admitted they did not know the exact stair upon which Mrs. Fox fell 
and admitted that no one inspected the exact stair upon which Mrs. Fox fell, thus the causation of 
her fall would have been left to the finder of fact's speculation. 
Second Issue (Conclusions of Law) 
The Court found, as a matter of law, that because there was no expert to opine as to 
whether Mrs. Fox fell because of her symptomatic, pre-existing, osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, 
knee that has lost cartilage, or for some other cause, that Mr. and Mrs. Fox could not sustain their 
burden of proof as to causation. In Beard v. K-Mart Corporation, 12 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Utah 
App. 2000), the Court held "... Beard argues that she was not required to put on expert medical 
evidence. Beard claims that under Utah law, expert medical opinions are generally only required 
in medical malpractice cases. We disagree." 
The Beard court goes on to state at page 1019: 
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"The question as to whether such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within 
the common knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and could be properly 
submitted to the jury. What is missing in the evidence, however, is the link 
between the injury suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah, in all but 
the most obvious cases, testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need for specific 
medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury. See generally 
Denney v. St. Mark's Hosp, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968); Moore v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R. R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (Utah 1956); 
Chief Consol Mining Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P.2d 929 (1922). 
"The need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link between the 
defendants' negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the 
injury. Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond an 
ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, 
there must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury." 
In this case there is neither expert medical testimony to establish a link between anything 
BYU did and Mrs. Fox's alleged injuries, but there is no expert testimony to establish a causal 
link between Mrs. Fox's fall and the treatment which she had. Whether or not she needed to 
have a fixator placed on her leg is beyond the ken of a lay person. 
Third Issue (Validity of Utah Code Ann., 78-27-33, as amended) 
Mr. and Mrs. Fox objected to the testimony of the emergency medical service personnel 
(Noah Converse and Scott Starr) and to the admission of the Utah EMS Incident Report and the 
Brigham Young University Police Department EMS Incident Table with Accompanying Report 
as exhibits, insofar as the testimony or the exhibits include a written or oral statement taken by 
the emergency medical service personnel while attending Mrs. Fox on April 20, 2004. The 
objection was based upon Utah Code Ann., §78-27-33, supra, a statutory rule evidence. 
Article VIII, Section 4 [Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court - Judges pro tempore -
Regulation of practice of law], of the Utah Constitution grants to the Utah Supreme Court the 
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right to adopt rules of evidence to be used in courts of the state of Utah. The Utah State 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Evidence as adopted by the Supreme Court only by a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of the Legislature. The Preliminary Note to the Utah Court Rules 
states: "Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules [of evidence], if and when these rules 
are adopted by the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed." 
The Utah Supreme Court ordered on September 10, 1985, in a Per Curiam decision: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as 
amended, the court adopts all existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence 
not inconsistent or superceded by rules of procedure and evidence heretofore 
adopted by this court. Effective as of July 1, 1985. 
Impliedly, the Utah Supreme Court does not adopt any existing statutory rules of 
evidence which are inconsistent or superceded by the Utah Rules of Evidence. That being the 
case, Section 78-27-33 is unconstitutional and has no force and effect. 
CONCLUSION 
BYU respectfully requests that the trial court be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 14th day of June, 2007. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a 
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until 
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme 
Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of 
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
tha t office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall 
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent 
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief 
justice as consistent with law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Membership on board of control of state law 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch . 247, § 1; 1986, library, § 9-7-301. 
ch. 47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, § 78-7-
§ 4. 21. 
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art 
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2. VIII, Sec. 7. 
Disqualification in particular case, Utah Retirement, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 15; 
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2. Title 49, Chapters 17 and 18; §§ 78-8-103, 
Judicial nomination and selection, Title 20A, 78-8-104. 
Chapter 12. Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Death Qualifi- Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 67, 
cation and the Right to an Impartial Jury 68. 
Under the State Constitution: Capital Jury C.J .S . — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A 
Selection in Utah After State v. Young, 1995 C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
Utah L. Rev. 365. 
78-2-1,5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
§ 4. tive July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of s tate 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
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78-2-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a s tatute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a 
first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch . 67, § 1; 1992, ch. 127, 
§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5; 
1995, ch. 299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 18; 2001, 
ch. 302, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws 
1986, ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as 
enacted by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to 
original appellate jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court, and enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, inserted "or 
charge" in Subsection (3)(i) and made styHstic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Chief justice to pre-
side over impeachment of governor, § 77-5-2. 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20A-4-406. 
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII, 
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B Utah R. App. P. 19. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 
78-2a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
m Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L Rev 150 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held 
more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, 
the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences 
on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge 
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a 
successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of 
Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in tha t office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, cfa. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank Renn v Utah State Bd of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases mvolv- P2d 677 (Utah 1995) 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
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COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natura l 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
c h . 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255, 
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
ment by ch. 255, effective April 30, 2001, added 
"parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 302, effective 
April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsec-
tion (2)(e) and made stylistic changes. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
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747 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 801 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Testimony at trial. but this is not mandatory Memam v Mernam, 
Subdivision (a) provides that a court-ap- 799 R2d 1172 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
pointed expert may be called as a trial witness, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Right of independent expert to nician, narcotics expert, or similar nonmedical 
refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 specialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L R.4th 
A.L.R.4th 680 388. 
Right of indigent defendant m state criminal Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes, prosecution to ex parte in camera hearing on 
74 A.L.R 4th 330. request for state-funded expert witness, 83 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal A.L.R.5th 541. 
case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, tech-
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the tr ial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the t ru th of 
the mat ter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A s ta tement is not hearsay if: 
(d)(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies a t the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the s ta tement and the 
s tatement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness 
denies having made the s tatement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent. The s ta tement is offered against a 
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity, or (B) a s ta tement of which the party has manifested 
an adoption or belief in its t ruth, or (C) a s ta tement by a person authorized by 
the party to make a s ta tement concerning the subject, or (D) a s ta tement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a mat ter within the scope of the agency 
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
s tatement by a coconspirator of a par ty during the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection been given under oath or subject to perjury. The 
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of former Utah rules admitted such statements as 
Evidence (1971). an exception to the hearsay rule. See California 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay confrontation problems under the Sixth 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated 
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the by the United States Supreme Court with the 
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence addition of the language "or the witness denies 
(1971). having made the statement or has forgotten" 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from the actual effect on most juries, 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the 
statements as substantive evidence if (l)incon- same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and (1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
does not require the prior statement to have interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
Rule 803 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 752 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of 
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identi-
fication, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or 
general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter 
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum 
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, 
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling 
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, 
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the 
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compi-
lations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities 
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law 
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal 
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, 
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal 
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 538 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Allegation of facts required 




Allegat ion of facts required. 
Because defendant did not allege any facts m 
support of his ineffective assistance claim, the 
appellate court would not remand the case for 
an evidentiary hearing It would be improper to 
remand a claim under this rule for a fishing 
expedition. State M Garrett, 849 P 2d 578 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P 943 (Utah 1993). 
Allegat ion of prejudice required. 
In hearing under this rule, criminal defen-
dant has burden of showing that counsel's rep-
resentation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and tha t but for counsel's er-
rors, a more favorable result would have been 
obtained; defendant, convicted of raping his 
daughter and sentenced to a term of 15 years to 
life, failed to demonstrate that trial or appel-
late counsel's ineffectiveness deprived him of 
the ability to raise meritorious arguments on 
appeal. State v. Reyes, 2001 UT 66, 31 P.3d 516. 
Applicat ion. 
Under this rule, appellate courts need no 
longer t reat the question of an adequate record 
as a necessary threshold issue; if the record is 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or defi-
ciencies resulting from the inadequacy will be 
construed in favor of a finding tha t counsel 
performed effectively. State v. Litherland, 2000 
U T 7 6 , 12 P 3d 92. 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea in a murder trial was timely filed, the 
mat ter was never adjudicated on the merits, 
and the trial court retained jurisdiction; there-
fore, the Supreme Court amended the remand 
to give the trial court jurisdiction to hear de-
fendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on 
the merits. State v. Lovell, 2005 UT 31,114 P.3d 
575. 
Purpose . 
A Rule 23B motion for remand is a special-
ized motion, available only in limited circum-
stances, to supplement the record with known 
facts needed for an appellant to assert an 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct ap-
peal, and if the facts already appearing in the 
record are sufficient to make the claim, a re-
mand is not needed. If defendant merely hopes 
to discover evidence suggesting ineffectiveness, 
a remand is not allowed, because the purpose of 
the rule is not to hold a "mini-trial" on ineffec-
tiveness of counsel. State v. Johnston, 2000 UT 
App 290, 13 P.3d 175. 
Cited in State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 
(Utah 1997); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P 2 d 285 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P2d 88 
(Utah 1999); State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 
190, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 7; State v. Mecham, 
2000 UT App 247, 9 P.3d 777. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
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Somchay Bansasine, as guardian for P.K., a minor, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Lu-
cas Bodell and Lang Rajsavong, individuals, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 960077-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
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November 15,1996, FILED 
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Third District, Salt Lake 
Department, Division I. The Honorable Anne Stirba. 
DISPOSITION: The trial court properly granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment. Affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff guardian and 
minor sought review of the decision of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Division I (Utah), which 
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant driver 
in the guardian and minor's action that alleged that the 
negligence of the driver resulted in the death of the mi-
nor's father. 
OVERVIEW: The driver was involved in an altercation 
with another driver, and the other driver shot at the 
driver's vehicle and the minor's father was killed. The 
trial court concluded that the firing of the gun was an 
intervening and superseding act that cut off any liability 
of the driver. The court affirmed. The court held that the 
only issue on appeal was whether the driver's reckless 
driving was the proximate cause of the injury. On appeal 
the guardian and minor claimed that the trial court erred 
in its determination because the driver should have been 
able to have foreseen that if he drove recklessly and 
rudely, someone might have fired a weapon into his car, 
injuring his passenger. The court held that the trial court 
was correct when it determined that a reasonably jury 
could not have found that the driver's actions were the 
proximate cause of the death of the minor's father. The 
court decided that a gunshot was not within the scope of 
the risk created by the driver's actions. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the summary judgment 
in favor of the driver. 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Re-
view > General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Standards > 
General Overview 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
General Overview 
[HN1 ] Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because 
the issue of summary judgment is a question of law, an 
appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for cor-
rectness, giving no deference to the trial court's resolu-
tion of the legal issues presented. 
Civil Procedure > Summary Judgment > Appellate Re-
view > General Overview 
Torts > Negligence > Causation > General Overview 
Torts > Negligence > Duty > General Overview 
[HN2] A prima facie case of negligence requires proof of 
four elements: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of 
care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant's 
breach of duty was the actual and proximate cause of 
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plaintiffs injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a 
result of defendant's breach of duty. 
Civil Procedure > Trials > Jury Trials > Province of 
Court & Jury 
Torts > Negligence > Causation > Proximate Cause > 
Intervening Causation 
[HN3] Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural 
and .continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient interven-
ing cause, produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause-
the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury. While proximate causation is gen-
erally an issue for the jury, a trial court may rule as a 
matter of law on the issue if: (1) there is no evidence to 
establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to 
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could 
not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evi-
dence on proximate causation. 
Torts > Negligence > General Overview 
[HN4] A more recent negligent act may relieve the liabil-
ity of a prior negligent actor under the proper circum-
stances. 
Torts > Negligence > General Overview 
[HN5] Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates 
or increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substan-
tial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is 
brought about through the intervention of another force 
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the 
harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is not 
within the scope of the risk created by the actor's con-
duct. 
COUNSEL: Daniel F. Bertch, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lants. 
Lynn S. Davies and Kent W. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellees. 
JUDGES: Before Judith M. Billings, Judge, James Z. 
Davis, Associate Presiding Judge, Pamela T. Green-
wood, Judge. 




Plaintiff Somchay Bansasine, as guardian for P.K., 
appeals the trial court's summary judgment dismissing 
her negligence claim against defendant Lang Rajsavong. 
Specifically, Bansasine claims a reasonable juror could 
find that Rajsavong's reckless driving was the actual and 
proximate cause of a driver, angered by Rajsavong's 
driving, shooting P.K.'s father, a passenger in Ra-
jsavong's car. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Rajsavong was driving northbound on Interstate 15 
with plaintiffs father when Lucas Bodell drove up close 
behind them, blinding Rajsavong with his lights. Ra-
jsavong changed lanes, letting Bodell pass. Angered at 
being blinded, Rajsavong got behind Bodell [**2] and 
flipped on his high beams. He then sped up, passed 
Bodell, and changed back into the lane in which Bodell 
was driving. In response, Bodell drove up parallel to 
Rajsavong on the passenger side. Rajsavong then sped up 
to seventy-five miles per hour only to have Bodell follow 
suit. As Bodell caught up with Rajsavong, plaintiffs fa-
ther made an obscene gesture at Bodell. Bodell pulled 
out a gun and displayed it in his palm. Rajsavong sped 
up in an effort to get away from Bodell. As Bodell drove 
by in his truck, Rajsavong heard a "bang," and plaintiffs 
father told Rajsavong that he had been shot. Rajsavong 
took plaintiffs father to a hospital, where he later died. 
Plaintiff brought suit against Rajsavong, claiming 
Rajsavong's reckless driving resulted in the death of her 
father. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment 
claiming defendant's actions were not, as a matter of law, 
the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. The trial court 
granted the motion, concluding Bodell's firing of a gun 
was an intervening and superseding act cutting off any 
liability of Rajsavong. Plaintiff appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
[HN1] "Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact [**3] exist and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 626-27 
(Utah 1994). Because the issue of summary judgment is 
a question of law, we review the trial court's decision for 
correctness, giving "no deference to the trial court's reso-
lution of the legal issues presented." Id. at 627. 
[HN2] A prima facie case of negligence requires 
proof of four elements: (1) defendant owed plaintiff a 
duty of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) defen-
dant's breach of duty was the actual and proximate cause 
of plaintiffs injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as 
a result of defendant's breach of duty. Clark v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598f 600-01 (Utah App. 1995). De-
fendant conceded, for purposes of summary judgment, 
that he owed plaintiff a duty, he breached that duty, and 
927 P.2d 675, *; 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 27; 
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plaintiff suffered injuries. Thus, the only issue on appeal 
is whether defendant's "reckless driving" was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiffs injury. 
[HN3] Proximate cause is '""that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient 
intervening cause), produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the [**4] 
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation 
the factors that accomplish the injury.'"" Id. (quoting 
Mitchell v Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246-47 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 
(Utah 1984))). While proximate causation is generally an 
issue for the jury, a trial court may rule as a matter of law 
on the issue if: '"(1) there is no evidence to establish a 
causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury specula-
tion, or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on 
the inferences to be derived from the evidence on proxi-
mate causation/" Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Man-
agement Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah App. 1991), 
affd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)). 
[*677] In the instant case, the trial court ruled that 
reasonable persons could not disagree that Bodell's inten-
tional (or negligent) l firing of a gun at plaintiffs father 
was an intervening and superseding cause which cut off 
any responsibility of defendant. On appeal, plaintiff 
claims the trial court erred in making this determination 
because defendant should have been able to foresee that 
if he drove recklessly and rudely, someone might fire a 
weapon into [**5] his car, injuring his passenger. We 
disagree. 
1 As alternative causes of action, plaintiff 
claimed both that the gun was fired intentionally 
and that it was fired accidentally. 
Utah courts have consistently recognized that [HN4] 
'"a more recent negligent [or criminal/intentional] act 
may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor 
under the proper circumstances.1" Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 
488 (citation omitted). These circumstances arise when 
the more recent negligent or criminal act was unforesee-
able to the first negligent actor. Id. If, on the other hand, 
the subsequent criminal or negligent act was "foreseeable 
to the prior actor, both acts are concurring causes and the 
prior actor is not absolved of liability." Id; see also 
Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246 (Utah 1985). Thus, the ques-
tion becomes whether Rajsavong could reasonably have 
foreseen plaintiffs father being shot as a result of his 
alleged "reckless" and rude driving. 
We conclude the trial court was correct in determin-
ing that [**6] a reasonable juror could not have found 
that defendant's driving was the proximate cause of the 
death of plaintiffs father. 2 We agree that a reasonable 
juror could not find that defendant should foresee that 
another driver on the road would fire a gun into his car 
simply because he shined his high beams on that person, 
passed him, then sped up as the driver tried to approach.3 
If such a response were so common as to make it fore-
seeable, the streets and highways of this country would 
be empty. 
2 Plaintiff claims the following three cases 
mandate that we determine it was error to take 
this case from the jury: Cruz v. Middlekauff Lin-
coln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 
1996) (determining that when car dealership has 
history of thefts and yet continues to keep keys in 
cars and does nothing to improve security, it may 
be foreseeable that a thief would steal a car, drive 
recklessly while being pursued by police, and in-
jure a bystander); Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 
697 P.2d 240, 246-47 (Utah 1985) (holding on 
proper facts hotel's inaction in providing security 
could be proximate cause of wrongful death of 
patron killed by intruder); Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp. 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah 
App. 1991) (concluding injury to customer during 
chase of shoplifter could be a foreseeable conse-
quence of negligent training of personnel in pur-
suit of shoplifters), affd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 
1993). While we agree that these cases help set 
the parameter of the law dealing with proximate 
cause in the context of summary judgment, we 
find all three cases distinguishable. In each of the 
three cases the specific facts of each case could 
lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the ac-
tions resulting from the defendants' negligence 
were not extraordinary and hence, were foresee-
able. In this case, however, we conclude the 
shooting was an extraordinary reaction to rude 
driving, thereby making the result unforeseeable. 
[**7] 
3 We express no opinion as to the added effect 
of an obscene gesture in relation to the facts of 
this case with the exception of noting that it was 
the plaintiffs father who made the obscene ges-
ture to the shooter, and that it was this gesture 
that immediately precipitated the shooter bran-
dishing the gun. 
Plaintiff next claims that it is enough to prove only 
that defendant could have foreseen the general risk of 
harm that occurred. Specifically, plaintiff argues that 
defendant could reasonably foresee that aggressive be-
havior of some kind might be a response to his rude driv-
ing, which is exactly what occurred although the specific 
action was different from what might reasonably be ex-
pected, i.e, a car accident or running the defendant off 
the road. While we agree that "only the general nature of 
the injury need be foreseeable," Steffensen v. Smith's 
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Management Corp, 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993), 
plaintiff goes too far in defining what "general nature" 
means. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B 
(1965) states: 
[HN5] Where the negligent conduct of the actor cre-
ates or increases the [**8] risk of a particular harm and 
is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that 
the harm is brought about through the intervention of 
another force does not relieve the actor of liability, ex-
cept where the harm is intentionally caused by a third 
person and is [*678] not within the scope of the risk 
created by the actor's conduct. 
(Emphasis added.) Although we recognize that 
many aspects of today's society are becoming more vio-
lent and confrontational, we cannot conclude that a gun-
shot is within the scope of the risk created by defendant's 
rude and reckless driving. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that defendant only needed 
to be able to foresee the injury that occurred, i.e., death, 
and not the specific means that caused that injury. In 
particular, plaintiff claims that because death was a fore-
seeable outcome of reckless driving—such as through a 
collision or being run off the road--it does not matter that 
the death resulted from a gunshot. Plaintiff misperceives 
the law. While plaintiff again correctly states that only 
the "general nature of the injury need be foreseeable," 
Steffensen, 862 P 2d at 1346, plaintiff misunderstands its 
meaning. In this case, the general nature [**9] of the 
injury is not death. Rather, death is the result of the in-
jury; the injury was a gunshot wound. Thus, as above, for 
plaintiff to prevail, defendant must have been able to 
foresee that his reckless driving might lead to a shooting. 
As previously stated, defendant could not have foreseen 
this result, and thus, his reckless driving could not have 
been the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly held that under the facts of 
this case, defendant could not have foreseen that his 
"reckless driving" would lead to another driver firing a 
weapon into his car. As such, the trial court properly 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. We 
therefore affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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OPINION BY: JUDITH M. BILLINGS 
OPINION 
[**1016] BILLINGS, Judge: 
[*P1] Defendant/appellant K-Mart Corporation (K-
Mart) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a 
partial directed verdict. We reverse and remand for a 
new trial. 
FACTS 
[*P2] On September 15, 1996, plaintiff/appellee 
Darlene Beard (Beard) was injured in a K-Mart store 
when a K-Mart employee struck her in the head with his 
elbow as he attempted to start a lawnmower. As she fell 
toward the floor, she felt a severe headache, as well as 
pain in her wrists, knee, and ankle. She visited her doctor 
the following day, complaining of head, neck, knee, and 
foot pain, and continued to have severe headaches, a sore 
neck, aching hands, and leg and foot pain. Beard saw a 
number of doctors and ultimately underwent a number of 
surgeries. Beard sued K-Mart for its employee's [***2] 
negligence in striking her. Three surgeries, performed on 
her neck and wrists by Dr. Robert Peterson, are at issue 
in this appeal. K-Mart asserts these surgeries are not 
causally connected to the accident at its store. 
[*P3] At trial, Beard testified that her neck and 
wrist problems began when she was struck in the head at 
K-Mart. In addition, her family physician and her sur-
geon Dr. Peterson testified "there was a chronologic as-
sociation for the time of the incident [at K-Mart] to the 
time of the onset of symptoms." However, Dr. Peterson 
testified that he could not say to a degree of reasonable 
medical probability that the accident at K-Mart caused 
the need for either her neck or wrist surgeries. 
[*P4] At the close of Beard's case, K-Mart moved 
for a partial directed verdict, arguing Beard had not pre-
sented sufficient evidence [**1017] to permit the jury 
to find that her need for the neck and wrist surgeries was 
the proximate result of the injuries she had suffered at K-
Mart. ' The trial court denied K-Mart's motion, and the 
jury awarded Beard $ 431,290.22 in damages. 
1 Both parties characterize K-Mart's motion as 
one for a directed verdict; however, the motion 
was effectively one requesting a jury instruction 
excluding consideration of the evidence regarding 
the neck and wrist surgeries. 
[***3] STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P5] "When reviewing any challenge to a trial 
court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review 
'"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 
fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if 
reasonable minds could disagree with the ground as-
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serted for directing a verdict."'" Mahmoodv. Ross, 1999 
UT 104, PI6, 990 P. 2d 933 (quoting White v. Fox, 665 
P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983) (quoting CookAssocs., Inc. 
v Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983))). If we 
conclude Beard did raise a material fact precluding 
judgment against her as a matter of law, we must affirm 
the trial court's denial of K-Mart's motion and uphold the 
jury's verdict. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P6] K-Mart argues Beard failed to present expert 
medical testimony establishing that her need for neck 
and wrist surgeries was caused by K-Mart's negligence. 
The essence of K-Mart's argument is that Beard's own 
testimony and the general testimony of her doctors that 
she did not suffer neck and wrist complaints before the 
injury at K-Mart is insufficient [***4] as a matter of law 
to allow the jury to consider whether these surgeries 
were a result of K-Mart's negligence. K-Mart argues that 
only expert medical testimony that the need for her sur-
geries was proximately caused by K-Mart's negligence 
will suffice. Thus, K-Mart argues the trial court erred in 
not directing a verdict in its favor and removing this evi-
dence from the jury's consideration. 
[*P7] K-Mart relies on Denney v. St. Mark's Hospi-
tal, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968), for the propo-
sition that "if the expert evidence offered on the issue of 
medical causation is simply that a particular injury could 
have resulted from a particular accident, but not that it 
probably did, such testimony is insufficient for submis-
sion of the issue to the jury." In Denney, the plaintiff had 
undergone neck surgery and was having x-rays taken of 
her lumbar spine for unrelated treatment when a medical 
technician forcefully pushed her neck close to her knees, 
allegedly causing a feeling like an electric shock in the 
back of her neck. See Denney, 442 P.2d at 944-45. Two 
days later, she suffered a stroke. See id. More than four 
months later, the [***5] plaintiff told her neurologist 
that her neck had been forced forward during the spinal 
x-rays. See id. The following year, a spinal fusion was 
performed and a neck nerve severed to relieve pain. See 
id. The plaintiff alleged the x-ray technician's negligence 
was responsible for her ailments. See id. At trial, she 
testified as to the feeling in her neck when the technician 
pushed on it, and to continuing pain, numbness, and loss 
of vision after the incident. See id. Additionally, her neu-
rologist testified that the force used by the technician 
could cause disc problems, but on cross-examination 
admitted it was a "medical probability" that her ailments 
were the result of the stroke. Id. 
[*P8] The Utah Supreme Court sustained the trial 
court's directed verdict in favor of the hospital. See id. at 
946. The court stated: 
in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the 
scientific effect of medicine, the results of surgery, or 
whether the attending physician exercised the ordinary 
care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the 
community which he serves, must ordinarily be estab-
lished by the testimony of physicians and surgeons. 
The only facts [***6] in the instant case which may 
be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of a lay 
witness are that the technician moved plaintiffs body, 
and that the back of her head hurt. No lay witness 
[**1018] can by the ordinary use of his senses say that 
the complaints of the plaintiff, including the hurting in 
the back of her head, was caused by this claimed adjust-
ment of her position on the x-ray table. 
Id. (quoting Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 387, 
227 P.2d 772, 774 (1951)). The court concluded that the 
plaintiffs evidence did not show that her injuries were 
the result of the negligence of the technician. See 442 
P.2dat947. 
[*P9] K-Mart also relies on Moore v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 
P.2d 849 (1956). In Moore, the plaintiffs doctor testified 
that "it was possible" that plaintiffs accident had caused 
a ruptured lumbar disc and nerve pressure. 292 P.2d at 
850. The doctor estimated a five percent permanent dis-
ability "based in part on the predictability of exacerba-
tion and remission of pain" over time. Id. The defendant 
moved to strike the doctor's testimony, arguing that "pos-
sibilities" [***7] were not probative, but the trial court 
denied the motion. Id. An instruction taking considera-
tion of a ruptured disc from the jury on the basis that no 
competent evidence had been given on the matter was 
likewise refused by the trial court. See id. 
[*P10] On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
doctor's testimony was "insufficient to provide a question 
of the existence of an injured disc." Id. The Utah Su-
preme Court recognized that the doctor's testimony re-
garding the permanency of the plaintiffs disability was 
"linked to the possibility of a disc injury" and was a sig-
nificant part of the plaintiffs case. Id. The court stated: 
"Under these circumstances, if the proof of such an in-
jury falls short of that required under our law, then an 
instruction to that effect should have been given the 
jury." Id. at 850-51. The court noted that under long-
standing Utah law, a "plaintiff retains the burden of prov-
ing his damages by competent evidence to an extent 
where the trier of fact could discover that which is 
probably true." Id. at 851 (emphasis added). The court 
agreed with the plaintiff that there was evidence of some 
injury, but stated: 
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the jury [***8] was allowed to speculate upon the 
existence of a disc injury, which may be determinative of 
the important element of permanency of the injury when 
no affirmative evidence was offered on this issue. Al-
though the medical testimony indicated that the symp-
toms showed a nerve irritation, and that such symptoms 
were consistent with the existence of a disc injury, we 
cannot discover in the witness' words anything more than 
their corollary that, under the circumstances a disc injury 
was not impossible. 
Id. at 259, 292 P.2d at 851. Because there was a 
strong likelihood the jury considered the permanency of 
the injury to have been proven by expert testimony, the 
court reversed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
holding that a limiting instruction should have been 
given. See id. 
[*P11] In the instant case, K-Mart argues that al-
though Beard testified her neck and wrist problems be-
gan at the time of her injury at K-Mart, her belief that her 
neck and wrist surgeries were, therefore, the result of that 
incident cannot overcome the failure of the medical evi-
dence to substantiate that belief. 
[*P12] In contrast, Beard argues she was not re-
quired to put on [***9] expert medical evidence. Beard 
claims that under Utah law, expert medical opinions are 
generally only required in medical malpractice cases. We 
disagree. 
[*P13] Beard presents cases from other jurisdictions 
holding that expert medical testimony is not required to 
submit to the jury questions about the need for medical 
treatment and expenses. See, e.g., Jordan v. Smoot, 191 
Ga. App. 74, 380 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); 
Polaco v. Smith, 376 So. 2d 409, 409-10 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1979); Walton v. Gallbraith, 15 Mich. App. 490, 166 
N.W.2d 605, 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969). However, we 
conclude these cases are factually distinguishable as they 
involve medical damages within the common experience 
of a layperson. 
[*P14] In Smoot, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
injuries she sustained in an automobile collision. See 380 
S.E.2d at 714. Her case consisted of "her testimony and 
that of the responding police officer, pictures of her 
damaged car, and her medical bill." Id. The [**1019] 
plaintiff testified that she visited a chiropractor the day of 
the accident and following the accident and that the 
[***10] chiropractic treatments had given her relief. See 
id. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant "on 
the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie 
personal injury case because she had not introduced ex-
pert medical testimony" connecting the collision and her 
injuries. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, stat-
ing "where, as here, there is no significant lapse of time 
between the injury sustained and the onset of the physi-
cal condition for which the injured party seeks compen-
sation, and the injury sustained is a matter which jurors 
must be credited with knowing by reason of common 
knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
[*P15] Beard also relies on Walton v. Gallbraith, 15 
Mich. App. 490, 166N.W.2d 605 (Mick Ct. App. 1969). 
In Walton, the plaintiff sued the defendant for neck, 
back, and shoulder injuries caused by a car accident. See 
166 N. W.2d at 605. At trial, no physician testified for the 
plaintiff, and the defendant "objected to the admission 
into evidence of bills for medicine and treatment on the 
ground that there was no showing that they were causally 
connected with the . . . [***11] accident." Id. The de-
fendant also requested an instruction to exclude the jury's 
consideration of the bills. See id. The trial court denied 
both motions, and the jury awarded the plaintiff $ 3500 
in damages. See id. On appeal, the defendant argued it 
was error to introduce plaintiffs medical bills. See id. 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued "that a causal 
connection between the accident and the injury may be 
shown without expert testimony." Id. at 605-06. The 
court stated: 
A brief review of the function of the jury leads us to 
the conclusion that plaintiffs position is the correct one. 
Her testimony emphasizes the facts that there were no 
previous neck or back pains and that they began the day 
after the accident. 
In a situation such as this, // should be clear to men 
of common experience that the cause of the injuries was 
the accident and no expert was needed to demonstrate 
this fact. 
Id. at 606 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court 
sustained the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. See 
id. 
[*P16] In this case, the question is not whether the 
accident at K- Mart caused Beard injury, but rather 
whether injuries sustained [***12] as a result of the ac-
cident at K-Mart required the neurological surgeries per-
formed on Beard's neck and wrists. Beard was properly 
permitted to testify that the accident in the store caused 
pain and injury. The question as to whether such pain 
and injury resulted from the blow is within the common 
knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and could 
properly be submitted to the jury. What is missing in the 
evidence, however, is the link between the injuries suf-
fered and the necessity of the surgeries. In Utah, in all 
but the most obvious cases, testimony of lay witnesses 
regarding the need for specific medical treatment is in-
adequate to submit the issue to the jury. See generally 
Denney v. St. Mark's Hosp., 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 
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944 (J968); Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R R. 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (Utah 1956); Chief 
Consol Mining Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P 929 
(1922). Certainly whether the need for complex neuro-
logical surgery was a result of the accident at K-Mart is 
not within the common experience of laypersons. As 
stated in Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp., 44 Wn. App. 
244, 722P.2d819, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986): [***13] 
The need for positive expert testimony to establish a 
causal link* between the defendants' negligent act and the 
plaintiffs injury depends upon the nature of the injury. 
Where the injury involves obscure medical factors which 
are beyond an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessi-
tating speculation in making a finding, there must be 
expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused 
the injury. 
722 P. 2d at 824. "The diagnosis and potential continu-
ance of a disease are medical questions to be established 
by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay per-
sons." Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 
516, 352 S.E.2d832, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, we 
conclude expert testimony on this medical causation is-
sue was required before the issue [**1020] of damages 
arising from these surgeries was submitted to the jury. 
[*P17] Plaintiff alternatively contends that even if 
she was required to put on expert medical testimony that 
her need for neck and wrist surgeries was caused by the 
accident at K-Mart, she introduced adequate expert 
medical testimony. 
[*P18] Dr. Peterson, the surgeon who performed 
Beard's neck surgery and both wrist surgeries, [***14] 
testified extensively regarding the causes of Beard's neck 
pain, wrist pain, and his surgical treatment of them: 
A: The question is, you know, what the cause is. The 
answer is, basically, I have no way of proving anything. 
But the association is that Mrs. Beard came to me and ~ 
and, more or less, was a person who was doing well prior 
to this incident at K-Mart and since that time has been 
suffering a rather significant problem which could be ~ 
you know, which was associated with some significant 
anatomic compromise in her neck. And from my stand-
point, there was a chronologic association from the time 
of the incident to the time of the onset of the symptoms. 
Q [by Beard's counsel]: What do you mean by 
chronological association? 
A: Happened at the same time. . . . To my knowl-
edge, [Beard] did not have these complaints prior to be-
ing hit at K-Mart. 
Q: Can you interpret for us what you found on the 
MRI? . . . 
A: Bone spur. 
Q: What causes bone spurs? 
A: Well, sort of the same thing that causes a bunion, 
irritation, disk - an old disk herniation which has re-
ceded, abnormal movement, local irritation. 
Q: Is that also the aging process as well? 
A: Being on a planet [*** 15] with gravity. 
Q [by K-Mart's counsel]: You performed neck sur-
gery on Darlene Beard because she had marginal osteo-
phytes in her neck, bone spurs. 
A: That's essentially correct. 
Q: Those were pre-existing to September 15, 1996. 
A: That would be my best guess. 
Q: In fact, you termed, in your deposition, that as a 
severe form of degenerative disk disease; is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: All of that was pre-existing long before this It-
Mart incident ever happened? 
A: No argument. 
Q: Do you know how long? 
A: Have no idea. 
Q: Do you know how they got there? 
A: As mentioned previously in testimony, it is es-
sentially concomitant with being on a planet with gravity 
long enough. But it has to do with local irritation and 
other potential compromises such as trauma. 
Q: You don't know whether it was trauma, whether it 
was heredity, whether it was wear and tear, whether it 
was gravity — as to how those bone spurs got there. 
A: Absolutely no idea. 
Q: And you're not saying to the jury, to a degree of 
reasonable medical probability, that this incident at K-
Mart caused such a condition in her neck: isn't that cor-
rect? 
A: No, Fm not telling [*** 16] the jury that at all. 
Q: You just don't know, do you? 
A: No. 
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[*P19] When questioned about the wrist surgery, 
Dr. Peterson testified: 
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that any other 
incident, other than the accident of 9-15-96, may have 
caused this condition? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. Could trauma cause that 
A: Trauma — trauma can cause carpal tunnel syn-
drome. At least certainly aggravate pre-existing condi-
tion. 
Q: Okay. And so, you're not telling the jury, again, 
to any degree of reasonable probability that her carpal 
tunnel was caused by this incident at K-Mart; isn't that 
correct? 
A: That's correct. 
[**1021] [*P20] We simply cannot say from the 
record before us that the expert medical testimony was 
sufficient to allow the jury to consider whether Beard's 
surgeries were necessitated by K-Maif s negligence and 
if so what damage she suffered as a result of those sur-
geries. 2 Without the required expert medical opinion 
linking the injury to the necessity of the surgery, a jury 
would simply be speculating about a linkage that is be-
yond its knowledge and experience. The expert medical 
testimony merely established a chronological [***17] 
relationship between the accident and her symptoms. No 
expert medical testimony was received that the neck and 
wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident. Thus, 
it was error for the trial judge not to grant a directed ver-
dict removing these issues from the jury. Therefore we 
must reverse and remand for a new trial. 
2 Counsel for K-Mart conceded and we con-
clude that Beard will have an opportunity on re-
mand to offer competent expert medical testi-
mony on the issue of whether the accident at K-
Mart either caused the need for her neck and 
wrist surgeries or exacerbated a pre-existing con-
dition which necessitated the surgeries. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
[*P21] WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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OPINION 
[**1150] RUSSON, Justice: 
[*P1] Emery County and the City of Green River 
("Green River") appeal the trial court's declaratory judg-
ment in favor of Grand County declaring that section 17-
2-6(2) of the Utah Code is unconstitutional under article 
XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution, and appeal the 
trial court's failure to certify the election results approv-
ing Emery County's annexation of that portion of Green 
River located within Grand County ("Green River por-
tion of Grand County") pursuant to their petition for 
election review. Grand County cross-appeals the trial 
court's grant of Emery County and Green River's petition 
for election review and the trial court's attendant inter-
pretation of section 17-2-8 o/[***2] the Utah Code. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] This appeal arises out of a long-standing con-
troversy between neighboring Grand County and Emery 
County and Green River, which straddles those counties' 
common border. The Green River portion of Grand 
County, with the consent and encouragement of Emery 
County, petitioned the relevant county legislative bodies 
to be annexed by Emery County, the desired result being 
that all of Green River would be located in Emery 
County instead of spread across two counties. These 
same parties were before this court in 1998 in connection 
with the same underlying controversy. In that case, 
Grand County v. Emery County, 969 P.2d 421 (Utah 
1998), Grand County successfully challenged a previous 
version of section 17-2-6, the statute at issue in this ap-
peal, in an attempt to thwart Emery County's annexation 
of the Green River portion of Grand County. While the 
underlying controversy between the counties remains the 
same, the statutory framework within which the battle 
rages has been changed by the Utah Legislature through 
the subsequent enactment of House Bill 49 ("H.B. 49"), 
H.B. 49, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess., 2000 Utah Laws 115, 
during the 2000 [***3] general session. The constitu-
tionality of the amended statutory scheme is the central 
subject of this appeal. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
[*P3] On August 3, 2000, Grand County filed an 
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
Emery County and Green River related to Emery 
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County's attempt to annex the Green River portion of 
Grand County. On September 1, 2000, Grand County 
moved for a preliminary injunction in an effort to prevent 
Emery County and Green River's annexation proposal 
from being submitted to the voters of Emery County and 
the voters of the Green River portion of Grand County. 
The trial court denied Grand County's motion for injunc-
tive relief but directed any party wishing to challenge the 
results of the election to petition for election review at 
the appropriate time after the election. The annexation 
proposal was submitted [**1151] to the relevant voters 
in the 2000 general election. 
[*P4] After the election, Grand County refused to 
certify the election with regard to the annexation pro-
posal. Emery County and Green River petitioned for 
election review on December 1, 2000, to compel certifi-
cation of the voters' approval of the annexation proposal. 
The trial [***4] court consolidated Grand County's 
original action for declaratory judgment with the petition 
for election review. 
[*P5] On December 14, 2000, the trial court 
granted Emery County and Green River's petition for 
election review and determined that the relevant annexa-
tion statute, sections 17-2-6 and -8 of the Utah Code, 
requires approval of an annexation proposal by a major-
ity of the voters in the area of the city or town to be an-
nexed and the annexing county, and that in the 2000 gen-
eral election, a majority of the voters in Emery County 
and the Green River portion of Grand County had ap-
proved the proposal. Despite this determination, the trial 
court refused to certify the election results because it 
simultaneously held section 17-2-6(2) of the Utah Code, 
the statute pursuant to which the election was held, un-
constitutional, and consequently, granted Grand County 
its requested declaratory relief. The trial court ruled that 
section 17-2-6(2) of the Utah Code was unconstitutional 
because it violated the "general law" provision of article 
XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution. The parties timely 
appealed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P6] The issue of "whether a statute is constitu-
tional [***5] is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court." State 
v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, P30, 40 P. 3d 611; see also State 
v. Kell, 2002 UT 19, P5Q, P.3d ; Grand County v. 
Emery County, 969 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah 1998). Further-
more, to the extent we are making a determination of a 
statute's constitutionality, the '"statute is presumed con-
stitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor 
of constitutionality.'" Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of 
Educ, 2001 UT2, P 9, 17 P. 3d 1125 (quotation and cita-
tion omitted); see also Daniels, 2002 UT2 at P30. Addi-
tionally, because interpreting the Utah Constitution pre-
sents a question of law, we review the trial court's deter-
mination for correctness and give no deference to its 
legal conclusions. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, PI9, 44 
P. 3d 756; Cache County v. Prop. Div. of State Tax 
Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANNEXATION 
STATUTE 
[*P7] On appeal, Emery County and Green River 
first argue that the trial court erred in [***6] granting 
Grand County declaratory judgment that section 17-2-
6(2) is unconstitutional. In ruling that section 17-2-6(2) 
is unconstitutional, the trial court concluded that section 
17-2-6(2/s requirement—that a county wishing to annex 
a portion of the territory from an adjoining county must 
first acquire a concurrent resolution passed by a two-
thirds majority of both houses of the legislature approv-
ing the annexation proposal and then the governor's sig-
nature approval on such a resolution-violated the "gen-
eral law" provision of article XI, section 3 of the Utah 
Constitution, which establishes the general procedure 
and voting requirement regarding county annexations 
and the legislature's power to delineate the conditions of 
the annexation process. See Utah Const, art. XI, § 3. 
[*P8] Emery County and Green River maintain that 
section 17-2-6(2), H.B. 49, which amended section 17-2-
6, and House Concurrent Resolution 6, H. Con. Res. 6, 
53d Leg., Gen. Sess., 2000 Utah Laws 1660-61-the 
resolution passed by the legislature approving the an-
nexation proposal—either are not "special laws," or in the 
case of the concurrent resolution, is not a "law" at all, 
and therefore, they do [***7] not violate article XI, sec-
tion 3. 
[*P9] Article XI, section 3 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
No territory shall be stricken from any county unless 
a majority of the voters living in such territory, as well as 
of the county to which it is to be annexed, shall vote 
therefor, and then only under such [**1152] conditions 
as may be prescribed by general law. 
Utah Const, art. XI, § 3. 
[*P10] This provision sets forth the basic require-
ments and framework for annexation and delegates to the 
legislature the authority to dictate the conditions under 
which annexation may occur. However, the legislature's 
power to set those conditions is limited by the provision 
in that the legislature may prescribe such conditions only 
"by general law." Id. 
[*P11] Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the 
legislature enacted title 17, chapter 2 of the Utah Code. 
Page 3 
2002 UT 57, *; 52 P.3d 1148, **; 
450 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; 2002 Utah LEXIS 84, *** 
Specifically, section 17-2-6 prescribes the conditions 
under which one county can annex a portion of the terri-
tory of an adjoining county. This section of the statute 
sets forth two different annexation methods. 
[*P12] The first annexation method (the "tradi-
tional method") allows for a majority of the voters in 
[***8] an area of a county to petition their county legis-
lative body to allow the area in which they live to be 
annexed by an adjoining county. Utah Code Ann. §17-
2-6(1)(a). The county legislative body, upon receiving 
such a petition in accordance with the provisions of the 
statute, must submit the annexation proposal to the voters 
of the county from which territory is to be annexed and 
to the voters of the county to which the territory is to be 
annexed. Id. § 17-2-6(1)(b). Under this annexation 
method, an annexation proposal is approved if "a major-
ity of those voting in each county have voted in favor of 
[the] annexation." Id. § 17-2-8(2)(a) (Supp. 2001). 
[*P13] The second or alternative annexation 
method (the "amended alternative method"), which is at 
issue in this case, was amended by the passage of H.B. 
49 during the 2000 general session of the legislature. The 
amended alternative method provides for a similar peti-
tion process but goes further and sets forth a modified 
and supplemental procedure applicable where the area 
seeking to be annexed shares a common boundary with 
the annexing county and where the area proposed to be 
annexed (1) "is [***9] located within a city or town 
whose boundaries extend into the proposed annexing 
county," (2) "is contiguous to the portion of the city or 
town that is located within the proposed annexing 
county," and (3) "includes all of the city or town that is 
within the county from which the area is proposed to be 
taken." Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-6(2)(a)(i)(A)-(C). Under 
these circumstances, one county can annex a portion of 
an adjoining county if "by a two-thirds vote of each 
house, the Legislature passes a concurrent resolution" 
approving the annexation proposal, id. § 17-2-6(2) (a) (ii), 
the governor signs the concurrent resolution, id. § 17-2-
6(2)(a)(Hi), and an economic analysis of the annexation 
proposal is conducted and the analysis demonstrates that 
the cost and revenue effects of the annexation proposal 
fall within the specific parameters described in the stat-
ute, id. § 17-2-6(2)(b). In an election on an annexation 
proposal brought under the amended alternative method, 
an annexation proposal is approved if "a majority of vot-
ers living in the area proposed for annexation" and "a 
majority of voters living in the county to which the area 
is proposed to [***10] be annexed have voted in favor 
of annexation." Id § 17-2-8(2) (b). 
[*P14] In order to determine if section 17-2-6, as 
amended by H.B. 49, is constitutional under article XI, 
section 3, we must determine if it is a general law. The 
standards for evaluating challenged legislation under the 
"general law" provisions of the Utah Constitution are set 
forth in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Utah Insur-
ance Guaranty Ass fn: 
A general law applies to and operates uniformly upon all 
members of any class of persons, places, or things requir-
ing legislation particular to themselves in the matters 
covered by the laws in question. On the other hand, spe-
cial legislation relates either to particular persons, places, 
or things or to persons, places, or things which, though 
not particularized, are separated by any method of selec-
tion from the whole class to which the law might, but for 
such legislation, be applied. . . . The constitutional prohi-
bition of special legislation does not preclude legislative 
classification, but only requires the classification to be 
reasonable. 
[**1153] 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977); see also 73 
Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 5 (1974). Furthermore, [***11] 
where the legislature has made such a legislative classifi-
cation, the classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as 
there is some basis for the differentiation between classes 
or subject matters included as compared to those ex-
cluded from its operation, provided the differentiation 
bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accom-
plished by the ac t . . . . 
. . . If a reasonable basis to differentiate those in-
cluded from those excluded from its operation can be 
found, it must be held constitutional. 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 755-56 
(quotations omitted). In other words, a law is a general 
law where, to the extent it makes a classification, that 
classification (1) is reasonable and (2) applies and oper-
ates uniformly as to all members composing the class. 
[*P15] Section 17-2-6, as amended by H.B. 49, is a 
general law. It is clear that the amended alternative 
method provided for in section 17-2-6(2) creates a legis-
lative classification and differentiates between portions 
of counties generally and those portions that are cities or 
towns that straddle county boundaries. Neither of 
[***12] the parties disputes the reasonableness of this 
classification. 
[*P16] While the plain language of H.B. 49 does 
not provide an express indication of the legislature's ba-
sis for differentiating between portions of counties gen-
erally that seek annexation and those areas of counties 
that are portions of cities or towns that straddle county 
lines that seek annexation, and there does not appear to 
be any legislative history associated with H.B. 49 to 
guide us, it is not difficult to discern from the language 
of the bill and the statute that the legislature was con-
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cerned about keeping cities and towns wholly within a 
single county instead of two counties. The cities and 
towns belonging to the class occupy the unique position 
of straddling a county boundary and falling within two 
counties. ' The purpose of the legislation is to provide an 
additional, and in some respects easier, method of an-
nexation for the cities and towns caught in the awkward 
position of straddling a county line. The legislature did 
not arbitrarily include or exclude members from the class 
to which the statute is applicable, but instead, included 
only members to which the purpose of the statute might 
apply. Therefore, [***13] the legislature's basis for dif-
ferentiating between the members of the class subject to 
section 17-2-6(2) and other portions of counties in gen-
eral "bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be 
accomplished by the act" and is otherwise reasonable. 
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 564 P.2d at 756. 
1 There are presently four cities/towns that fall 
into the class created by the statute. While the 
number of members of the class may be relatively 
small, this does not render the law in question 
"special." 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 10 (1974). 
Moreover, as populations grow and shift, and as 
cities and communities expand, new members of 
the class may come into existence. 
[*P17] As to the "uniform operation" requirement 
for general laws, Grand County essentially argues that 
section 17-2-6(2) was enacted specifically to address the 
Green River situation and that the statute will not operate 
uniformly as to the other members of the class because 
the statute includes no legal standards related to [***14] 
the passage of a concurrent resolution by the legislature 
or approval of such a resolution by the governor. Grand 
County argues that under the statutory scheme as it now 
stands, there is no guarantee that any of the other class 
members will be able to successfully lobby the legisla-
ture and the governor for passage and approval of a con-
current resolution similar to the one secured by Emery 
County and Green River in this case. Grand County's 
arguments are unavailing. 
[*P18] Section 17-2-6(2) applies uniformly to the 
members of the class. As previously indicated, there are 
four cities/towns that are presently members of the class. 
One of those class members, Green River, has success-
fully employed the procedure provided for in the statute. 
Any of the other class members may utilize the section 
17-2-6(2) procedures in the same manner as Green River 
did. Under the uniform operation of the statute, those 
class members would be [**1154] required to lobby the 
legislature for a concurrent resolution, to secure the gov-
ernor's signature of such a resolution, to conduct the re-
quired economic analysis, and ultimately to gain the ap-
proval of a majority of the voters living in the appropri-
ate areas. [***15] The procedure for the class members 
is identical. Green River was afforded no special treat-
ment in the application of the law, and there is no indica-
tion that any other class member would be treated any 
differently or required to meet any disparate burdens. 
The mere fact that Emery County and Green River were 
successful in utilizing the amended alternative method 
does not render the statute a special law. 
[*P19] Grand County further argues that even if the 
underlying annexation statute is a general law, the con-
current resolution passed by the legislature and signed by 
the governor is a special law, or has the effect of a spe-
cial law, since such a resolution is required by the under-
lying statute and no vote on annexation can go forward 
without the resolution. The trial court appeared to en-
dorse essentially the same argument when it concluded 
in its memorandum decision that the "concurrent resolu-
tion approved by the Governor is functionally indistin-
guishable from legislation." We disagree. 
[*P20] The concurrent resolution is not a "law" and 
therefore is not subject to the "general law" limiting lan-
guage of article XI, section 3 because a resolution of the 
Utah Legislature [***16] is not legislation and does not 
have the force or effect of law. Salt Lake City v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 813 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1991); 73 Am. 
Jur. 2d Statutes § 3 (1974) ("The general rule is that a 
joint or concurrent resolution adopted by the legislature 
is not a statute, [and] does not have the force or effect of 
law . . . .") . 
[*P21] Nor does the requirement of a concurrent 
resolution passed by the legislature and signed by the 
governor transform the underlying general law into a 
special one. The concurrent resolution required as part of 
the amended alternative method has no effect of law. It 
neither grants nor denies annexation to a city or town or 
county. It merely represents a condition precedent to an 
annexation proposal brought under the amended alterna-
tive method being presented to the relevant voters in the 
county or area to be annexed. Article XI, section 3 of the 
Utah Constitution clearly indicates that such conditions 
may be set by the legislature. 
[*P22] Finally, in its memorandum decision the 
trial court characterized the requirement of a concurrent 
resolution as giving the "last word on any county bound-
ary change" to the legislature [***17] and the governor 
instead of to the voters. This is incorrect. 
[*P23] We read the plain language of the statute 
"as a whole," interpreting its provisions "in harmony 
with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other 
statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, P17, 5 P.3d 616 (quoting Roberts v. 
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (per curiam)). 
The trial court's analysis and conclusion ignore the pres-
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ence of the traditional method in section 17-2-6(1). The 
concurrent resolution requirement does not give the leg-
islature and the governor the "last word" on county 
boundary changes because a city or town that is unsuc-
cessful in utilizing the procedures of the amended alter-
native method in section 17-2-6(2) by not acquiring a 
concurrent resolution from the legislature, or for that 
matter, an economic analysis that meets the requirements 
of the amended alternative method, would always have 
recourse to the traditional method found in section 17-2-
6(1), which is free from all of the additional require-
ments of the amended alternative method. 
[*P24] Therefore, the trial court erred when it con-
cluded as [*** 18] a matter of law that section 17-2-6, as 
amended by H.B. 49, was an unconstitutional "special 
law" because the legislative classification made by the 
statute has a reasonable basis that is reasonably related to 
the purposes of the statute and because the statute applies 
and operates uniformly as to the members of the class. 
II. INTERPRETATION OF "VOTERS" 
[*P25] On cross-appeal, Grand County challenges 
the trial court's conclusion that section 17-2-8 of the Utah 
Code requires that an [**1155] annexation proposal 
brought pursuant to section 17-2-6(2) receive a majority 
of the votes of those who actually voted on the annexa-
tion proposal in the area to be annexed and in the annex-
ing county in order to be approved. Emery County and 
Green River appeal the trial court's refusal to certify the 
result of the election in accordance with the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute and its determination that the 
annexation proposal received the required electoral ap-
proval. 
[*P26] Grand County argues that the statute should 
be interpreted to require that an annexation proposal 
brought under section 17-2-6(2) receive a majority of the 
votes of "registered" voters in the area to be annexed 
[***19] and in the annexing county in order to be ap-
proved. Grand County supports its position by noting 
that the legislature amended the language of section 17-
2-8(2) (b) that sets forth the standard for approval of an 
annexation proposal brought pursuant to section 17-2-
6(2). Prior to the legislature's amendment of section 17-
2-8(2)(b) through the enactment of H.B. 49, the standard 
of approval for an annexation proposal brought pursuant 
to either subsection 17-2-6(1) or subsection 17-2-6(2) 
was the same "majority of those voting" standard. The 
amendment altered the language setting forth the ap-
proval standard for section 17-2-6(2) annexation propos-
als from a majority of "those voting" in the area proposed 
for annexation and in the county to which the area is to 
be annexed, Utah Code Ann. § 17-2-8(2)(b) (1999), to a 
majority of "voters living" in those two areas, Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-2-8(2)(b) (Supp. 2001). Grand County argues 
that the legislature amended the language of the statute to 
require approval of a majority of "voters living" in the 
relevant areas in order to impose a higher standard than 
the majority of "those voting" requirement. [***20] In 
Grand County's view, the new language inserted by the 
legislature requires a majority of "registered" voters in 
the relevant areas even if those registered voters failed or 
chose not to vote on the annexation proposal in question. 
Under Grand County's statutory interpretation of section 
17-2-8, the amended language of section 17-2-8(2) (b) 
cannot be interpreted to set the same standard of ap-
proval for an annexation proposal as the "majority of 
those voting" language in section 17-2-8(2)(a) which 
was left unaffected by H.B. 49's amendment. If the two 
phrases are interpreted as meaning the same thing, sec-
tion 17-2-8(2) (a) becomes redundant with section 17-2-
8(2)(b) and the change in the language was unnecessary. 
In other words, according to Grand County, the legisla-
ture's decision to change the language was purposeful 
and the change would not have been made unless some 
different meaning and standard was in fact intended. 
[*P27] The voting requirement associated with 
county annexation is constitutionally mandated and de-
fined. See Utah Const, art. XI, § 3. The legislature has 
the authority to set the conditions of annexation by gen-
eral law, but it does not have the authority [***21] to 
establish or modify the voting requirement set forth in 
the plain language of article XI, section 3. Because the 
voting requirement is constitutionally intended and de-
scribed, and because the language of the statute and the 
constitution are identical, we interpret the constitutional 
language and impute that meaning to the same language 
used by the legislature in the statute. See Odd Fellows' 
Bldg. Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 114, 177 P. 214, 215 
(1918); see also People ex rel. Baird v. Tilton, 37 Cal. 
614, 622 (1869) ("The same construction should be 
given to the same language used in the same connection, 
in reference to a similar subject matter, when used in a 
statute, as when used in the Constitution."); People ex 
rel. Akin v. The Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 III. 
236, 66 N.E. 349, 355 (III. 1903) ("When [a] statute is 
couched in the same language as the Constitution, the 
language of the statute will receive the same construction 
as that of the Constitution . . . ."). In the case at hand, the 
legislature's use of the exact language of the constitution 
suggests that it intended the language of section 17-2-
8(2)(b) and [***22] section 17-2-6(2)(a)(iv)(A)-(B) to 
have the same meaning and effect as the language of the 
constitution. See State v. Woodcock, 168 Vt. 588, 719 
A.2d 32, 32 (Vt. 1998). As a result, we need not address 
Grand County's arguments based on the interpretation of 
the statute or the legislature's intent in amending the lan-
guage of the statute but rather focus our analysis on 
[**1156] the meaning and interpretation of the constitu-
tional provision. 
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[*P28] As previously recited, article XI, section 3 
prohibits the territory of one county from being annexed 
by another county "unless a majority of the voters living 
in such territory, as well as of the county to which it is to 
be annexed, shall vote therefor." Utah Const, art. XI, § 3. 
[*P29] "In interpreting the state constitution, we 
look primarily to the language of the constitution itself. . 
. ." State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997). 
Therefore, our starting point in interpreting a constitu-
tional provision is the textual language itself. See State 
v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, P 20, 44 PJd 756; Utah Sch. Bds. 
Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ, 2001 UT 2, PI3, 17 PJd 
1125; [***23] In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge 
(Young), 1999 UT 6, P62, 976 P.2d 581 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). "We need not inquire beyond the plain 
meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless we find 
it ambiguous." Casey, 2002 UT29 at P20. 
[*P30] The language at issue here is clear and un-
ambiguous. "Voter" is defined as a "person who engages 
in the act of voting." Black's Law Dictionary 1571 (7th 
ed. 1999). Under this definition, article XI, section 3 
requires a majority of persons who engage in the act of 
voting who live in the territory to be annexed, as well as 
those who live in the county to which that territory is to 
be annexed, to vote in favor of an annexation proposal in 
order for it to be approved. In other words, the group of 
voters of which a majority is required consists merely of 
those who exercise the right to vote on the annexation 
proposal in question at the election in which the annexa-
tion proposal is offered for a vote. The number of votes 
cast at the ballot box itself is the basis for determining a 
majority, as opposed to the number of those possessing 
the qualifications to vote or those registered to vote in 
the annexing [***24] county or area to be annexed but 
who do not actually vote. Those citizens who fail or 
choose not to vote are presumed to assent to and acqui-
esce in the expressed will of the majority. This interpre-
tation of the meaning and effect of the phrase "majority 
of voters" is consistent with the well-settled, general rule 
of American election law concerning the method of 
computing a majority and with the long-standing inter-
pretations of similar constitutional language by the high-
est courts of our kindred states.2 
2 Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Perry County, 
156 US. 692, 712, 39 L. Ed. 585, 15 S. Ct 547 
(1895) ("It is well settled by the decisions of this 
court where a majority of those voting at an elec-
tion . . . vote in favor of [a proposition] for the 
purpose of registration [or certification] it will be 
presumed that such majority so voting is a major-
ity of all the legal voters living in the municipal-
ity at the time of the election . . . ."); County of 
Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360, 369, 24 L. Ed 416 
(1877) ("All qualified voters who absent them-
selves from an election duly called are presumed 
to assent to the expressed will of the majority of 
those voting, unless the law providing for the 
election otherwise declares."); Glover v. Hot 
Springs Kennel Club, Inc., 230 Ark. 544, 323 
S.W.2d 902, 905 n.4, 907 (Ark. 1959) (interpret-
ing constitutional and statutory language of "'ma-
jority of the voters of the county'" and "'majority 
of the qualified electors of such county"' as mean-
ing "a majority of those voting on the proposi-
tion" (citations omitted)); Vance v. Austell, 45 
Ark. 400, 406-07 (1885) (endorsing and applying 
reasoning of County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 
360, 24 L. Ed 416); People ex rel Mitchell v. 
Warfield, 20 III. 159, 164-65 (1858) (interpreting 
Illinois constitution's language requiring majority 
of voters of county to approve relocation of 
county seat as meaning majority of "voters of the 
county . . . who . . . vote at the election" and as 
excluding "other voters of the county who were 
detained from the election by absence or sick-
ness, or [who] voluntarily absented themselves 
from the polls"); In re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 
N.E. 865, 872-77 (Ind. 1935) (interpreting "voter" 
and "elector" in Indiana constitution and holding 
that group of voters of which majority is required 
consists of those who exercise right to vote); 
Walker v. Oswald, 68 Md 146, 11 A. 711, 713 
(Md. 1887) ("It has been settled, both in England 
and in this country, by an almost, if not quite, un-
broken current of judicial decisions from the time 
of Lord MANSFIELD to the present day, that 
when an election is held at which a subject-matter 
is to be determined by a majority of the voters en-
titled to cast ballots thereat, those absenting 
themselves, and those who, being present, abstain 
from voting, are considered as acquiescing in the 
result declared by a majority of those actually 
voting, even though, in point of fact, but a minor-
ity of those entitled to vote really do vote."); Tay-
lor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107, 116, 10 Gilf. 81-17 
(1865) (interpreting Minnesota constitutional 
provision requiring that laws changing estab-
lished county lines be approved by majority of 
electors of county to be affected and rejecting as 
manifestly inconvenient and absurd position that 
provision requires absolute majority of those 
qualified to vote in county at time of election); 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. County Ct., 33 
Tenn. 637, 691-93 (1854) (holding that when ap-
proval of proposition is referred "to the decision 
of a majority of the 'voters of a county,' [that 
phrase] cannot be understood [to] mean anything 
more than those who see fit to exercise the privi-
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lege [of voting on the proposition]"); 26 Am. Jur. 
2d Elections § 406 (1996) ("In the absence of a 
statutory provision to the contrary, voters not at-
tending the election or not voting on the matter 
submitted are presumed to assent to the expressed 
will of those attending and voting and are not to 
be taken into consideration in determining the re-
sult."); George W. McCrary, A Treatise on the 
American Law of Elections in McCrary on Elec-
tions § 208 (4th ed. 1897) ("Where a statute [or 
constitutional provision] requires a question to be 
decided . . . by the votes of'a majority of the vot-
ers of a county,' this does not require that a ma-
jority of all persons in the county entitled to vote 
shall actually vote affirmatively, but only that the 
result shall be decided by the majority of the 
votes c a s t . . . . The 'voters of the county' referred 
to by all such statutes [or constitutional provi-
sions] are necessarily the voters who vote at the 
election, since the result in each case must be de-
termined by a count of the ballots cast and not by 
an inquiry as to the number not cast."). 
[***25] [**1157] [*P31] Grand County's inter-
pretation of the constitutional language would essentially 
read the word "registered" into article XI, section 3 of the 
constitution, and consequently, require that the number 
of those voting in favor of the annexation proposal be a 
majority of those registered to vote in the annexing 
county and the area to be annexed instead of a majority 
of those voters from the relevant areas who actually 
voted on the annexation proposition during the election. 
This would effectively allow those registered voters in 
the two areas who did not actually vote to be counted as 
votes against the annexation proposal. Such a method of 
computing whether a majority of voters have approved a 
proposition or have elected a candidate would be con-
trary to the plain meaning of the constitutional provision 
and the long-established general rule.3 
3 It is worth noting that the general rule as 
stated herein for computing a majority of voters 
in an election can be modified by legislative en-
actment to require a greater majority. The legisla-
ture may require a two-thirds majority of voters 
or a majority of "registered" voters; however, it 
may do so only where granted the authority by 
the constitution and then only through explicit 
and clear language. As previously discussed, arti-
cle XI, section 3 does not give the legislature au-
thority to modify the voting requirement or ap-
proval standard set forth in the constitutional pro-
vision. In any event, it appears that the legislature 
was not attempting to modify or increase the ma-
jority required for approval of a section 17-2-6(2) 
annexation proposal, but rather, merely attempt-
ing to implement the stated voting requirement 
and standard as it appears in article XI, section 3 
by using the constitution's exact language. 
[***26] [*P32] Therefore, the trial court correctly 
concluded that only a majority of those voting on the 
annexation proposal in Emery County and the Green 
River portion of Grand County needed to vote in favor of 
the annexation proposal for it to be approved. However, 
the trial court erred in not certifying the results of the 
election in accordance with this standard and its determi-
nation that the required electoral approval had been 
achieved. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P33] For the foregoing reasons, the trial court 
erred in declaring that section 17-2-6(2) of the Utah 
Code is unconstitutional because it violates the "general 
law" provision of article XI, section 3 of the Utah Con-
stitution. Therefore, the trial court's grant of declaratory 
judgment to Grand County is reversed. Furthermore, the 
trial court also erred when it refused to certify the an-
nexation proposal election results consistent with its 
finding that the annexation proposal had received the 
approval of the required majority of voters in Emery 
County and the Green River portion of Grand County. 
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion and the trial court's previous finding 
that the annexation [***27] proposal received the re-
quired electoral approval. 
[*P34] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Jus-
tice Durrant, Justice Howe, and Justice Wilkins concur in 
Justice Russon's opinion. 
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CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a 
judgment from the trial court (Utah). The trial court 
granted a deficiency judgment against defendant after 
plaintiff sold equipment that plaintiff had leased to de-
fendant. 
OVERVIEW: Defendant leased two pieces of equip-
ment from plaintiff. The equipment consisted of a hy-
draulic shear and a lathe. When defendant defaulted on 
the leases, plaintiff repossessed and sold the equipment. 
Plaintiff thereinafter sought and was granted a deficiency 
judgment on the difference between the balance owing 
on the leases and the amount realized from the sale of the 
equipment. Defendant appealed the grant of a deficiency 
judgment. Defendant claimed plaintiffs sale of the 
equipment was not commercially reasonable, and plain-
tiffs notice of sale did not constitute reasonable notifica-
tion under Utah law. The court disagreed. In affirming 
the deficiency judgment, the court held that plaintiff 
made reasonable and diligent efforts to sell the equip-
ment for a commercially reasonable price. The court also 
found that plaintiffs notice to defendant regarding the 
sale was sufficient. 
OUTCOME: The court found plaintiffs efforts com-
mercially reasonable and affirmed the award of the defi-
ciency judgment. 
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[HN1] See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953, 1980 
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Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Arti-
cle 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Notice 
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Commercial Law (UCC) > Secured Transactions (Arti-
cle 9) > Default > Foreclosure & Repossession > Public 
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[HN2] See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953, 1980 
ed.). 
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > 
Clearly Erroneous Review 
[HN3] To mount a successful attack on the trial court's 
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the evi-
dence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favor-
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[HN7] Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) provides that 
reasonable notice should specify whether the sale is to be 
public or private. Further, if a sale is private, reasonable 
notice must specify the time after which the sale is to be 
made. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953, 1980 ed.). 
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concur: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, 
Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice. Stewart, Justice, 
concurs in the result. 
OPINION BY: ZIMMERMAN 
OPINION 
[*1069] Defendant Vernon R. Erickson personally 
guaranteed leases on two pieces of repossessed equip-
ment. He appeals from a deficiency judgment entered 
against him after the lessor, Kathy Scharf, sold the 
equipment. Erickson claims that Scharf s sale of the 
equipment was not "commercially reasonable" and that 
the notice of sale actually given did not constitute "rea-
sonable notification," all as required by section 70A-9-
504(3) of the Code. U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-504(3) 
(1980 ed.). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
In the spring of 1979, Scharf, doing business as 
Western Leasing, leased a $33,000 Summit hydraulic 
shear and an $18,000 Victor lathe to BMG Corporation. 
Michael R. and Bruce V. Erickson, the principals of 
BMG, and their father, Vernon R. Erickson, executed 
personal guarantees of faithful performance under the 
lease agreements. In April of 1980, BMG [**2] Corpo-
ration defaulted on the payments due under both leases, 
and on September 5, 1980, Scharf repossessed the 
equipment with the Ericksons' consent. On October 1, 
1980, Scharf sold the lathe for $6,000, and approxi-
mately a week later, she sold the shear for $19,000. She 
then brought an action pursuant to section 70A-9-504(2) 
of the Code, seeking to recover the difference between 
the balance owing on the leases and the amount realized 
from the sale of the equipment. 
At the October 8, 1982, trial, counsel for Vernon 
Erickson, the only defendant remaining in the action, 
argued that the sale of the equipment failed to comply 
with section 70A-9-504(3) of the Code, which gives a 
secured party the right to dispose of collateral after de-
fault. In pertinent part, that section provides: [HN1] 
"Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels 
and at any time and place and on any terms but every 
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, 
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." 
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-504(3) (1980 ed.). The same 
section also describes the notice that must be given to the 
debtor when collateral is disposed of: 
[HN2] Unless collateral is perishable 
[**3] or threatens to decline speedily in 
value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notifica-
tion of the time and place of any public 
sale or reasonable notification of the time 
after which any private sale or other in-
tended disposition is to be made shall be 
sent by the secured party to the debtor. 
Id 
Erickson asserted at trial that the method, manner, 
and timing of the sale all failed to meet section 70A-9-
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504(3 )'s standard of commercial reasonableness. He also 
asserted that the notice was technically deficient because 
it failed to state whether the sale would be public or pri-
vate and did not specify a date, time, and location for the 
sale. These inadequacies, according to Erickson, preju-
diced him by denying him the opportunity to arrange a 
sale on more favorable terms. 
After hearing the testimony, the trial court entered 
detailed factual findings supporting its conclusions that 
the sale was private, that it was conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner, that the notification met the 
statutory standard of reasonableness, that the prices re-
ceived for the equipment reflected its reasonable market 
value, and that any deficiencies in notice [**4] were not 
prejudicial to defendant. The trial court entered a defi-
ciency judgment for Scharf in the amount of $54,310.21 
and awarded her $3,500 in attorney fees. 
On appeal, Erickson again argues that the sale was 
not commercially reasonable and that the notice was in-
adequate under the statute, attacking both the trial court's 
factual findings and its legal conclusions. The chal-
lenges to the factual findings can be disposed of readily. 
Erickson makes numerous arguments based on the facts 
as he presented them to the trial [*1070] court, rather 
than on the facts as found by that court. However, at no 
point does he even discuss the detailed findings entered 
by the lower court that contradict his factual assertions. 
With respect to these matters, we take as our starting 
point the trial court's findings and not Erickson's recita-
tion of the facts. [HN3] To mount a successful attack on 
the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must mar-
shal all the evidence in support of the trial court's find-
ings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. See, e.g., Charlton v. 
Hackett, 11 [**5] Utah 2d 389, 390, 360 P.2d 176 
(1961); Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P. 2d 815 
(1981); Kohler v. Garden City; Utah, 639 P.2d 162, 165 
(1981); Hal Taylor Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 
Utah, 657 P.2d 743 (1982). Erickson has not begun to 
carry that heavy burden. Nowhere does he marshal the 
evidence supporting his version of the facts, much less 
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Under 
these circumstances, we decline to further consider 
Erickson's attack on the factual findings. 
We next consider Erickson's claim that the trial court 
erred in its conclusions of law. [HN4] The standard of 
review differs from that applicable to factual findings; 
we accord conclusions of law no particular deference, 
but review them for correctness. See, e.g., Automotive 
Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, 
Inc., Utah, 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1979); Betenson v. Call 
Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., Utah, 645 P.2d 684, 686 
(1982). Erickson first attacks the trial court's conclusion 
that, as a matter of law, the sale was commercially rea-
sonable. [HN5] Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Code re-
quires that a disposition of collateral must be commer-
cially reasonable in every [**6] aspect. Erickson claims 
that section 70A-9-507(2) describes what is necessary to 
satisfy the standard of commercial reasonableness. It 
provides: 
[HN6] The fact that a better price could 
have been obtained by a sale at a different 
time or in a different method from that se-
lected by the secured party is not of itself 
sufficient to establish that the sale was not 
made in a commercially reasonable man-
ner. If the secured party either [1] sells the 
collateral in the usual manner in any rec-
ognized market therefor or [2] if he sells 
at the price current in such market at the 
time of his sale or [3] if he has otherwise 
sold in conformity with reasonable com-
mercial practices among dealers in the 
type of property sold he has sold in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-9-507(2) (1980 ed.). Erickson ar-
gues that for a sale to have been commercially reason-
able, it must have been handled in one of the three modes 
set out in the above-quoted section. He then asserts that 
under the facts as he perceives them, none of these three 
standards have been met. His argument is without merit. 
Even if we were to assume that the facts as found by the 
lower court do not [**7] show that the collateral was 
disposed of in one of the three specified modes, Erick-
son's argument fails because the three types of disposi-
tion set out in section 70A-9-507(2) are examples only; 
they are not the exclusive method of authorized disposi-
tion. 
This provision of our Code is identical to its Uni-
form Commercial Code counterpart. In interpreting pro-
visions of our Code, we often turn to the official com-
ments of the Uniform Commercial Code for guidance. 
The official comment to the section at issue here dis-
poses of Erickson's argument. "None of the specific 
methods of disposition set forth in subsection (2) is to be 
regarded as either required or exclusive, provided only 
that the disposition made or about to be made by the se-
cured party is commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-507, 
comment 2 (1981). 
Since the statutory standard of commercial reason-
ableness cannot be measured with a bright-line test, 
whether any particular sale is commercially reasonable is 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. That determi-
nation depends on whether the circumstances of the sale 
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and the manner and business context in which it occurred 
[*1071] support a conclusion that the sale was [**8] 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. In this 
case, the facts found by the trial court provide ample 
support for the legal conclusion that the sale was com-
mercially reasonable. 
Erickson also contends that the notice of sale pro-
vided by Scharf did not comport with the statutory re-
quirements and, therefore, that no deficiency judgment 
can be had under the provisions of section 70A-9-504(2) 
of the Code. He relies on several technical deficiencies 
in the letter that operated as a notice of the sale. The 
September 8, 1980, letter informed him that the equip-
ment had been repossessed and demanded that he pay the 
total outstanding indebtedness. It also stated that "the 
equipment . . . . will be sold on September 30, 1980, 
unless the amounts due under the lease agreement have 
been paid." (Emphasis added.) Erickson points out two 
problems with the letter. First, it did not specify whether 
the sale was to be public or private. Second, the equip-
ment was not sold on September 30th as announced in 
the letter; one item was sold on October 1st, and the 
other was sold on October 9th. 
The letter was technically deficient in both respects. 
[HN7] Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Code provides [**9] 
that reasonable notice should specify whether the sale is 
to be public or private. Further, if a sale is private, as 
this one was found to be, reasonable notice must specify 
"the time after which" the sale is to be made. U.C.A., 
1953, § 70A-9-504(3) (1980 ed.) (emphasis added). 
Scharf s notice stated the day on which the sale was to 
occur, while the actual sales occurred one day and nine 
days, respectively, after the date fixed in the notice. 
In addition to relying on the technical deficiencies in 
the notice to protect him from the deficiency judgment, 
Erickson claims that he was prejudiced because he could 
have used the several days that elapsed between the date 
the sale was to have occurred and the date it actually 
occurred to find a buyer who would pay a higher price. 
His notice contention is without merit. In Pioneer 
Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee, Utah, 649 P.2d 28 
(1982), the debtor received notice that her repossessed 
truck would be auctioned off at 11:00 a.m. on a specified 
day; instead, the truck was sold at 10:00 a.m. Because 
the debtor did not show up at 11:00 a.m., we held that 
she was not prejudiced by the error. Id. at 29. By look-
ing beyond [**10] the technicalities of the notice re-
quirement to its essential purpose, Pioneer Dodge made 
it plain that the formal elements of the notice require-
ment must not be followed to the frustration of its pur-
pose. "The purpose of the notice requirement is for the 
protection of the debtor, by permitting him to bid at the 
sale, or arrange for interested parties to bid, and to oth-
erwise assure that the sale is conducted in a commer-
cially reasonable manner." FMA Financial Corp. v. Pro-
Printers, Utah, 590 P.2d 803, 807 (1979). The notice 
requirement gives the debtor the opportunity to actively 
protect his interests. 
In the present case, the purpose of the notice re-
quirement was adequately satisfied, and Erickson has 
shown no prejudice from the technical deficiencies. 
Throughout the period from April of 1980, when the 
lessees first defaulted, through October, when the sales 
occurred, Erickson and the other guarantors did nothing 
to secure purchasers for the equipment or otherwise pro-
tect their interests. The findings of the trial court estab-
lished that Erickson at no time showed any interest in the 
disposition of the collateral. Scharf took all the initiative 
in disposing of the equipment. [**11] She diligently 
sought out potential buyers and eventually arranged to 
sell the shear to Tan-Dem Machinery for the highest bid 
received-$ 17,000. On September 30th, well after Erick-
son had received his written notice, Scharf once again 
took the initiative, this time telephoning Erickson and 
informing him of the imminent sale. Erickson approved 
the bid. The sale to Tan-Dem fell through. About a week 
later, on October 9th, Scharf sold the shear to another 
party for $19,000, $2,000 more than Tan-Dem had of-
fered. 
[*1072] Because Erickson made no effort at any 
time to procure a buyer for either piece of equipment and 
had approved the sale of the shear on the day set forth in 
the notice for less than was eventually obtained, we can-
not find that he was prejudiced by either the technical 
defects in the notice or the slight delay in the sale. In 
fact, since he acquiesced to the lower bid, the delay actu-
ally worked to his advantage by lessening the deficiency 
by $2,000. Under these circumstances, we conclude that 
the notice was reasonable. 
The deficiency judgment entered by the lower court 
against Erickson is therefore affirmed. In light of the 
facts that the leases involved in [**12] this matter pro-
vided for an award of attorney fees to Scharf in any ac-
tion necessary to enforce the leases and the trial court 
awarded them to her in connection with the proceedings 
below, we remand the case for determination of reason-
able fees in connection with this appeal as well. Man-
agement Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 
Utah, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (1980). 
WE CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice, Rich-
ard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice. 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
Thomas W. Seiler, #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
POBox 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF 
NOAH CONVERSE AND SCOTT 
STARR WITH ACCOMPANYING 
EXHIBITS 
Civil No. 040401488 
Division 5 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on Tuesday, November 14, 2006, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, 
presiding. The Plaintiffs were present, pro se. The Defendant was present and represented by its 
counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, and David B. Thomas, 
Office of General Counsel, Brigham Young University. 
Upon oral motion, the Plaintiffs objected to the testimony of Noah Converse and Scott Starr 
and to the Utah EMS Incident Report and the Brigham Young University Police Department EMS 
Incident Table with Accompanying Report insofar as the testimony or the exhibits included a written 
or oral statement taken by Mr. Converse or Mr. Starr in their capacity as volunteer Brigham Young 
University Emergency Medical Service personnel attending to the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox on April 
20, 2004, on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the 
stairs") to the effect that: 
1. There was no cartilage in Linda A. Fox's right knee due to arthritis; 
2. Linda A. Fox's right knee went out on her as she was going down the stairs; 
3. Linda A. Fox fell down only one stair; 
4. Over and over again the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox said words to the effect that her 
knee just went out on her as she was going down the stairs and that she did not hold Brigham Young 
University responsible; and 
5. Over and over again the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox said that the stairs are too narrow 
and have always been dangerous. (See, generally, the Affidavit of Noah Converse with 
accompanying Exhibits dated February 15, 2005.) 
The Plaintiffs Foxes' objection was based upon Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-33, a statutory 
rule of evidence which, under certain conditions, if enforceable, would make statements of an injured 
person inadmissible as evidence in a civil proceeding. The Plaintiffs allege that the conditions set 
2 
forth in Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-33 apply. For the purpose of this Ruling, and for that purpose 
only, the Court assumes that the Plaintiffs are accurate in that regard. 
The Court denies the objection. In so doing, the Court relies, in part, upon the following: 
1. Utah State Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, which states, in part: 
"The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature 
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court 
upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. ..." 
2. On September 10, 1985, the Utah Supreme Court filed a pro curium order in the 
matter of In Re: Rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of this state. In pertinent 
part, that order states: 
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, Constitution of Utah, as 
amended, the Court adopts all existing statutory Rules of Procedure and Evidence not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure and evidence heretofore 
adopted by this Court. Effective as of July 1, 1985." 
3. The Preliminary Note to the Utah Court Rules states, in part: 
"Any existing statutes inconsistent with these rules ... will be impliedly repealed." 
4. The testimony and exhibits objected to by the Plaintiffs are admissions by a party 




5. The testimony and exhibits objected to by the Plaintiffs are, pursuant to Rule 
803(4), an exception to the hearsay rule as a statement for the purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment. 
DATED this / $ L _ day of. 
BY THE COURT: &*£££& 
JUD^SE FRED D./HOW 
Fourth District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF NOAH CONVERSE AND SCOTT STARR WITH ACCOMPANYING 
EXHIBITS was delivered, this 21 ST day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the manner 
indicated: 
Linda A. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Joseph R. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
A. - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
% - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
Xf^tl^^ 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
TO: LINDA A. FOX and JOSEPH R. FOX: 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above 
and foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS5 OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF NOAH CONVERSE 
AND SCOTT STARR W I T H ACCOMPANYING EXHIBITS to the Honorable Fred D. Howard for his 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this day of November, 2006. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON 
t^UU^ 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorney for Defendant 
G \SEILER\BYU FoxVOrder Denying Plaintiffs* Objections wpd 
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Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
iZ/izfa %%[ 
.Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 040401488 
Division 5 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on Tuesday, November 14, 2006, 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, 
presiding. The Plaintiffs were present in person and appeared pro se. The Defendant was present 
and represented by its counsel of record, Thomas W. Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, LC, 
and David B. Thomas, Office of General Counsel, Brigham Young University. Certain evidence 
was proffered. The parties advised the Court fully in the premises and does, hereby, enter the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiffs allege that the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox was injured on April 20, 2004, when 
she fell on the west stairs at the northerly end of the Harmon Conference Center (hereinafter "the 
stairs") as she descended the stairs. 
2. The Plaintiffs stipulated they would try this case without any expert witness of any kind 
on any subject, including but not limited to: 
a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and 
b. Mrs. Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 20, 2004. 
3. In the Spring of 2003, Linda A. Fox had been told by Dr. Richard Jackson that Linda 
would require a future knee replacement. (Linda Fox deposition, p.16: 11-14.) 
4. In the Spring of 2003, Dr. Richard Jackson had x-rayed Linda Fox's right knee and 
reported to her that her right knee was missing cartilage and diagnosed Linda Fox with an arthritic 
knee. (Linda Fox deposition, p. 17:6; Affidavit of Linda Fox, April 7,2005, f 2 (hereinafter referred 
to as "Fox Affidavit.") 
5. On April 20, 2004, Linda Fox told the Emergency Medical Service volunteers who 
attended to her that her knee went out as she was going down the stairs. (Affidavit of Noah 
Converse, f l l , b.) 
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6. Prior to the April 20, 200r, fall, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox had some cartilage missing in 
her right knee due to osteoarthritis. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Request for 
Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 11.) 
7. Before her fall on April 20, 2004, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox reported having pain on the 
lateral side of her right knee. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First Request for Admissions and 
Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 13.) 
8. Prior to Linda Fox's fall on April 20,2004, the Plaintiff Linda A. Fox was diagnosed with 
having some joint space narrowing in her right knee. (Plaintiffs' Answers to Defendant's First 
Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents, Request No. 14.) 
9. The Plaintiffs had, prior to Trial, determined not to call any expert witnesses and rested 
upon their theory that all elements of the Plaintiffs' claims could be provided for by lay testimony. 
10. The only facts concerning causation or the mechanism of injury in the instant case that 
may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses by a lay witness are that Linda Fox was 
descending the stairs and she fell. No lay witness can, by the ordinary use of the lay witness's 
senses, testify that whether the fall of Linda Fox was or was not caused by the symptomatic medical 
condition of Linda Fox's knee. 
11. Linda Fox fell without the physical intervention of any actor. 
12. The Plaintiffs' claims were all based solely on alleged negligence of the Defendant. 
3 
13. No person inspected the stairs after Linda Fox's alleged fall to determine the condition 
of the stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell. 
14. Plaintiffs do not know which stair Linda Fox was on when she allegedly fell. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs had no witness who could testify as to the condition of the stairs 
and had no witness who could testify as to whether or not the stairs were dangerous, the Plaintiffs 
agreed that there would be no expert testimony regarding the condition of the stairs. 
2. The Plaintiffs' determination that they would call no expert witnesses on any subject, 
including but not limited to: 
a. Causation/mechanism of injury; and 
b. Linda Fox's medical condition before and after her alleged fall on April 29,2004; 
precluded evidence that Linda Fox's fall was not caused by her symptomatic, pre-existing, 
osteoarthritic, joint narrowing, knee which had loss of cartilage. 
3. The Plaintiffs had not pled, with specificity, any portion of the Provo City Building Code 
in connection with this case nor had they named any person who could testify as to whether or not 
the stairs conformed to the Provo City Building Code. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 9(i), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the Court could not find that the stairs failed to conform to safety requirements 
of the building code. 
4 
4. In the absence of any expert witness who could opine as to whether Mrs. Fox fell because 
of her symptomatic, pre-existing condition as described above or for some other cause, the Plaintiffs 
cannot sustain their burden of proof as to causation. 
5. In the absence of any healthcare provider who could opine as to the reasonable necessity 
of any healthcare received by the Plaintiff Linda Fox, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of 
proof as to damages. 
6. Joseph R. Fox's claim is for loss of consortium. Because Linda A. Fox cannot sustain her 
burden of proof as to causation nor as to damages, the Plaintiff Joseph R. Fox's claim for loss of 
consortium fails. 
DATED this / ^ day of 
Approved as to form: 
; 2006. 
BY THE COURT: ;^%£J1?*0 
JUD0E FRED ty. HOW. 
Fourth District Court 
' * * * « > * & & * * • 
LINDA A. FOX - Plaintiff 
JOSEPH R. FOX - Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW was delivered, this 21 g\* day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the manner 
indicated: 
Linda A. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
- X - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
Joseph R. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
_x_ - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
TThcrYttJQJ 
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n n \ * 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
TO: LINDA A. FOX and JOSEPH R. FOX: 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above 
and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Honorable Fred D. Howard for his 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this £/~ day of November, 2006. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON 
•&CL 1 
IOMAS W. SEILER 
Attornev for Defendant 
G \SEILER\BYU - Fox\FOF & COL wpd 
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Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
Lori D. Huntington #6252 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
Facsimile: (801) 377-9405 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX and LINDA FOX, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
! Civil No. 040401488 
Division 5 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law does, 
hereby, grant the Defendant's oral motion to dismiss and dismisses the Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
causes of action therein, and all of the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant, with prejudice and 
upon the merits. 
DATED this / % day of ] ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 0 6 . 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
\z(l*{o£ m Dap„ty 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE was delivered, this ?.|«sV day of November, 2006, addressed as follows and in the 
manner indicated: 
Linda A. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
X - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
Joseph R. Fox 
1149 East 1630 South 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
-X. - via U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid 
- via Facsimile ( ) 
- via Hand Delivery 
^^j^^mx^ 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
TO: LINDA A. FOX and JOSEPH R. FOX: 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit the above 
and foregoing Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice to the Honorable Fred D. Howard for his 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this ^ / - d a y of November, 2006. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorney for Defendant 
G \SEILER\BYU - FoxYJudgment of Dismissal with Prejudice wpd 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH R. FOX, et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 
Defendant. 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 7040401488 PI 
Bench Trial 
Electronically Recorded on 
November 14, 2006 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD 
Fourth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Joseph R. Fox 
(Appearing pro se) 
Thomas W. Seiler 
80 N. 100 E. 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801)375-1920 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I (Electronically recorded on November 14, 2006) 
3 THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning. 
4 MR. FOX: Good morning, your Honor. 
5 MS. FOX: Good morning. 
6 THE COURT: Let me call the case and have'you make 
7 your appearance. This is case No. 040401488, the matter of 
8 Mr. Joseph R. Fox and Linda A. Fox, plaintiffs, versus Brigham 
9 Young University, defendant. I'll note for the record Mr. and 
10 Mrs. Fox are here. Good morning. 
11 MS. FOX: Good morning. 
12 MR. FOX: Good morning. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Seller? 
14 MR. SEILER: Tom Seiler for BYU, your Honor. I have 
15 with me David Thomas from General Counsel's Office at BYU who 
16 is co-counsel, and we also have Glen Johns from the Risk 
17 Management Office. 
18 THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you for your appearance 
19 and your preparations today. This is the time set for trial in 
20 this case. We did -- I wish to make a record regarding our 
21 communication yesterday afternoon. Thank you for being 
22 available. I'm sorry for that late discussion, but it was an 
23 important one that came to mind about the question of recusing. 
24 Are you prepared to address that question at this time? 
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I just want to know what Mr 
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we proceed, in review of the case something 
the Court that I wish to address that I 
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SEILER 
COURT: 
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That may shape the 






























motion at this 
> I'll hear from 
Id hear from Mr. Fox. 
-4-
1 MR. FOX: Yes. 
2 I MR. SEILER: Your Honor, we have in this case an 
3 allegation that Mrs. Fox as she was descending the stairs at 
4 Brigham Young University at Harmon Conference Center, which is 
5 sort of at the north end of campus, that she -- her allegation is 
6 that she fell on those stairs. We believe she did fall on those 
7 stairs. However, the question is why did she fall. There has 
8 been no expert wit -- or expert disclosure in this matter, and I 
9 would cite the Court most easily to the plaintiff's response to 
10 our defendant's motion in limine in their fact paragraph, 
11 paragraph 1 where it says, "Neither the plaintiffs nor the 
12 defendant have identified expert witnesses as required by Utah 
13 Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) on the case management order 
14 herein." So if -- I don't know if the Court has found that. 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR. SEILER: In fact, I have a courtesy copy. 
17 THE COURT: I'm okay. I've got it. 
18 MR. SEILER: So we know that there is no expert 
19 disclosure and that it should have been -- it was required by 
20 both the rule and by the case management order. 
21 Did the Court have a chance to read that motion 
22 yesterday -- that memo? 
23 THE COURT: I have. 
24 MR. SEILER: Okay. In this instance what is the 
25 mechanism of injury? There is many things that we do not know 
- 5 -
1 and that really are not within the canon of the average person. 
2 We don't know the rate at which metal -- that the metal screws 
3 deteriorate. Now the claim is -- there's two claims, two 
4 different opposing claims. One is Mrs. Fox in one affidavit says 
5 that she tripped and fell. Another one says that she slipped and 
6 fell, that her foot went out from underneath her. 
7 In any event, the claim must be that there was something 
8 wrong with the -- something on the tread. There has to be 
9 something wrong with something on the tread in order for their 
10 claim to have any validity at all. 
11 In this instance we have no -- we don't have any proof 
12 of that, and here's why we don't. We don't know what the 
13 location was. We asked in affidavit form and in deposition form 
14 what caused -- you know, what was wrong with the stair. We don't 
15 know that. We don't know where the stair was that she fell upon. 
16 She says in her affidavits that she doesn't know the exact 
17 location. We have no one who inspected the stair tread. No one 
18 looked at it. No one knows whether it was -- no one -- there's 
19 nobody that's going to sit on the witness stand and say, "I saw 
20 that stair tread," or "I saw that metal nosing and it was 
21 defective in these ways, 1, 2, 3," whatever. There just isn't 
22 anybody that will say that. 
23 We don't have any person who will say, "This is the rate 
24 at which metal nosings deteriorate and the rate at which they 
25 should be replaced." That testimony is not before the Court. 
-6-
1 There is no witness thar will say that. 
2 We have -- when I say we have no expert, we also have no 
3 expert on how she was injured, that is whether she was injured 
4 because her osteoarthritic knee gave way or because something 
5 else made her fall. We don't have any testimony about that. The 
6 closest you might have is you might say, "Well, what about the 
7 medical doctors, what about what they had to say." 
8 Those people are people identified according to the 
9 plaintiff's responses to the request for production of documents. 
10 They're identified in the initial disclosures, which are called 
11 names of individuals likely to have discoverable evidence, Rule 
12 26. That's what -- that's the pleading that's referred to. In 
13 each of the --
14 THE COURT: Well, is that test — is that record going 
15 to be before the Court? I mean you've --
16 MR. SEILER: It's part of — I believe it's part of the 
17 file, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: And that's my question. You made reference 
19 to this -- I noted m your motion, for example, page 8 you say, 
20 "Doctor -- Linda Fox reported to the emergency room physician 
21 Dr. Murdoch that her right knee suddenly gave out. She collapsed 
22 down to the ground," and then IHC preliminary, "She fell, her 
23 knee came out from underneath her." Is that a citation, then, to 
2 4 the medical records? 
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em at that point. They also 
the exhibits that they delivered to us 


























records include important information about treatment she 
received for her injuries? 
MR. SEILER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that they also contained what would be 
considered a history of the patient? 
MR. SEILER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Or — and she may dispute the statements 
made, but those are statements recorded? 
MR. SEILER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that correct? 
MR. SEILER: That's correct. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. SEILER: What they don't say is the cause of the 
injury — 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. SEILER: — other than saying that her foot gave out 
from under her -- her knee gave out, I believe, is the actual 
term. So that's what they say about that. We think that you 
must have some causation testimony. You have the plaintiffs 
saying they don't know exactly where she fell. You have no one 
testifying as to the condition, that they inspected the stair or 
any group of those stairs as to what that condition is. You 
don't have --
THE COURT: They don't have testimony of something that 



























there is some 
up, but that' 
went on April 
THE 
it? Well, ag 
MR. 
there's not a 
THE 
MR. 
SEILER: They do not. 
-10-
The very closesz you come is | 
testimony that you could hear 
s it. Afterwards there is test 
noise as you walked 
imony that Mr. Fox 
23rd -- this fall occurred on April 20 --
COURT: Well, that's more duty 
ain, maybe it's both. 
SEILER: Well, it's al so causat 
defect in the stair that cause 
COURT: Yeah, okay. 
SEILER: — how could 






had, the very 
a defect as t 
COURT: All right. 
SEILER: We know there 
's plenty of testimony 
about that. 
very best in answer to 
there --
than causation, isn't 
ion, your Honor. If 
d the accident — 
you know, how could 
's a defect in the knee 
about or 
the one 
closest you have to any defect 
o the stair that Mrs. 
know what stair that was. It is ra 




treads. So he may have seen some some other 
no testimony 
loose were at 
affidavit and 
his affidavit 
to the effect that the 
the location she fell 
in his deposition, I 
and the request for -
plenty of 
question the Court 
in the stairs is not 
on because we don't 
Fox saying he went on 
saw some loose metal 
time, but there is 




he testifies in his 
lso, but at least in 
to request for 
- 1 1 -
1 production of documents, XVI dor/t know rhe location of her f all." 
2 She admits she doesn't know the location of her fall. 
3 She says it was on — this stair has three cascading 
4 sets of stairs with two landings in between them. There's a 
5 group of stairs and then there's a landing, a group of stairs and 
6 a landing. Mrs. Fox says that she believes it was approximately 
7 in the middle of a group of stairs of the la -- and approximately 
8 on the -- probably on the bottom of the three sets. So that's 
9 the most you have. You don't have anybody say, vxWe" — or you 
10 don't have her saying, "I saw either before or after I fell on 
11 that stair this defect." It does not occur. 
12 Now the second -- let's see if I can hit all that. Oh. 
13 The second part of that motion is as to damages themselves. What 
14 caused the damage? If you assume for a moment that Mrs. Fox 
15 slipped on the stairs in some way, and even assume that there was 
16 some negligence -- which there's no evidence of, but if you got 
17 that far -- nobody has been set forth as an expert to say that 
18 the injuries she sustained was caused by tripping or falling. 
19 Rather, the other reasonable explanation is she had 
20 osteoarthritis of the knee, and the medical techs say one of the 
21 things that happen is your bones break. Indeed, the more likely 
22 explanation is that her -- she stepped hard enough that her bone 
23 broke. But there's no testimony one way or the other, and that 
24 is not within the common canon of a lay person. We simply have 





























1 That's i 
I mean it's 
people say, 
You have Mrs 
not as though there was a car accident 
-12-
and 
"Oh, I saw car A run the stop light and hit 
. Fox saying, "I went down the stairs and my 
out from underneath me," and that is the testimony 
t. There is 
and without some leg 
forward, 
be no la 
actually. C 
no other causation. Without the causation 
of the damages, there is no way to go 
,ertainly the Court ought to order that 
y testimony as to causation and no expert testimony 
causation. 
question 






, then. This 
as seemingly 
MR. SEILER: 
t have anyone 
caused the fa 
expert and I 
Well, this -- I mean I have another 
there 
as to 
motion is couched as a motion in limine, 
a dispositive conclusion by your position. 
Well, if — I don't know what's left. 
who can say, "I observed the fall and 
11," whatever that was, or someone who 
went back and looked at the stairs and 
- or looked at the knee and this is what caused" --
THE COURT: 







No, I mean my question is is that this 





Certainly, because I don't know what's left 
I see. All right. 










































where the defendant 
We 
show a prima 
believe 
facie 





sitting motion and 
As far as 














No, I car/t think of anything. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
Thank you for your time a 
Good morning. 
Good morning, your Honor. 
in limine, as I understand 
motion was simply to contro 
to argue the merits of the 
chose to go. 
nd effort. 
With respect to the 
it, the motion --
1 the presentation 
case, but that's 
that we can present sufficient evidence to 
case using lay testimony. The evidence will 
as she descended the stairs in a reasonable 
epped on a worn, loose metal nosing and her 
e edge of the stair and she 
broke her leg. 
causation is concerned, we 
Could I ask you a couple 
Sure. 
I had to say -- I've read 
to be your position. 
Very good. 
I assume that you don't t 
is, I concluded from your pleading 
position -- you don 't dispute the idea that an 
fell in a twisting 
believe that that's 
of questions? 
your opposition 
ake -- my^under --
that you take the 


































y on this, 










but you are here to present: tnat testimony 
testimony. You're not disputing that you do 
That's correct. 
-- designated an expert on the subject. 
We have designated an expert. 
But you're presenting -- you intend to 





















Through lay testimony. 
That's correct. 
The other question I had is I assume that 









: There is? 
Yes. 
: You do not intend to admit them? 
No. 
So what is your proof of treatment? 
She was taken immediately from the stairs to 
and was — 
COURT 
FOX: 































She's noi presenting any evidence about how I 





Well, she'll say what — the treatment that 
she was taken into surgery and they installed 










How can she present testimony about that? 
That's what happened to her. 
How does she know that? 
We have photographs to show her condition as 
— when she came out of surgery. 
THE COURT : Well, that's my question. You're not going 
to present any of this -- seemingly, that would require evidence 











Know about what? I 
How she was treated. Was she awake when she 
She went into surgery -- she was taken from 
— she was taken from the stairs by BYU. She was taken to 
emergency room. 
into the hospital. 
surgery on her leg, 
she received. 
THE COURT: 
From the emergency room she was admitted 
While she was in the hospital they performed 
installed a fixator, and that's the treatment 
Okay, but she's not qualified to say what 
they did to her because she doesn't --






























fixator on her leg, 
MR. FOX: 

















She had been told that they installed 
I assume. 
No, no, it was an external fix -
Okay. 
It's an external fixator. It's 
larger in diameter than her leg. 
So it's a brace? 
And it was attached to her bone, 
for 11 weeks. That was the treatment 
COURT You don't intend to offer any 
to how -- other than her statement of 
FOX: 





























That's correct, and my statement that I 
on in the hospital. 
Yeah, okay. So — 
We have the photographs to show 
-- you've got the observation 
that. 
and the 
fixator, but that's the testimony about 
saw 
— 
Medical bills that we received that we paid is 
Medical bills. 
Those are our damages, the medical bills 
- for the treatment that she received. 
and 
-17-
1 THE COURT: So these medicai records you do not intend 
2 to offer? 
3 MR. FOX: Medical records from the doctors9 
4 THE COURT: Yeah. 
5 MR. FOX: No. In fact, we believe that they contain 
6 statements of an injured person, which are not admissible, since 
7 we never saw those records until a year after. 
8 THE COURT: Who described the medical records? I 
9 understood that you people had designated them. 
10 MR. FOX: We did not designate them. We did not 
11 designate them m our exhibits that we exchanged --
12 THE COURT: You have not. 
13 MR. FOX: — in September. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
15 MR. FOX: We did not identify any of those — the 
16 doctors. 
17 THE COURT: Have the defense identified those as 
18 exhibits? 
19 MR. FOX: No. 
20 THE COURT: They have not? 
21 MR. FOX: Well, I take it back. In their exhibit list 
22 they did have those medical records, yes. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
24 MR. FOX: So our case is that we believe that we can 













































: And really, the crux of this motion is what 
aw to be and whether that can be done by lay or 
That's correct. 
: Okay. Go ahead. I've interrupted you. 
Well, if the Court's read -- I don't — I 




stair? Is it your 
to be the defect o 
MR. 
ticket. She 
mean she was 
FOX: 
came < 
: Let me ask you one other question if I 
Sure. 
: What do you say about the defect on the 
position she will describe what she considers 
f the stair? 
She -- Mrs. Fox went there. She purchased a 
down the stairs. She wasn't taking note -- I 
just walking down the stairs. I mean you don't 
normally take note 
condition of 
THE 





: What I meant is Mr. Seller's argument about 
to the stair; what do you say? 
The causation is that — we'll present ev — 
Ms. Fox's testimony that as she was coming down the stairs she 
-19-
1 stepped on a metal nose and she heard the metal nose then 
2 clatter, and her foot slipped off the metal nose and she fell. 
3 I'll testify that two days after she fell I went to BYU to return 
4 the ticket she had purchased. While I was there I examined the 
5 stairway, and I took photographs of the stairs to show the 
6 deterioration -- general deterioration of the stairs generally. 
7 Of course, we didn't have any knowledge of the stairway before 
8 that. Then I took photographs of the stairs not knowing exactly 
9 where she had fallen. So after she had -- after she was released 
10 from the hospital and had recovered sufficiently that we -- she 
11 could travel — it was about three weeks later -- we went to the 
12 stairway and found that they had been replaced. The stairway had 
13 been completely rebuilt. 
14 THE COURT: Three weeks later? 
15 MR. FOX: Well, it was actually started — I believe the 
16 construction started the 1st of May, around the 1st of May. 
17 THE COURT: Following the fall? 
18 MR. FOX: Following the fall. So it was within two 
19 weeks of her fall that construction on the stairs had begun. So 
20 there was no opportunity for us to obtain an expert or to inspect 
21 the stairs otherwise, except for the photographs that I have. It 
22 was m that time period between April 22nd and the 1st of May that 
23 I took the photographs of the stairs, and that's the 
24 documentation we have for the condition of the stairs. 
25 THE COURT: Is there any evidence m this matter about 
-20-
1 notice to BYU of the defective stair9 
2 MR. FOX: Yes. A year before Mrs. Fox fell another 
3 person fell on the stairs and broke his arm. At that time BYU 
4 started a process of replacing the stairway. That will be in 
5 testimony today. So from August -- I think the first request was 
6 in August of 2003 to April of 2004, that process was ongoing to 
7 replace the stairway. 
8 THE COURT: To replace it. They were gradually 
9 reconstructing the stairs? 
10 MR. FOX: They weren't working on the stairs at all. 
11 They --
12 THE COURT: What did you mean9 
13 MR. FOX: They — 
14 THE COURT: That process was what? 
15 MR. FOX: Well, they go through — apparently from the 
16 documents I have they go through a process where someone requests 
17 that some work by done. It has to go through an evaluation 
18 process and a bid estimate process, and then they let it out for 
19 bids. Then a contractor is selected, and then the work is 
20 scheduled to be performed. The contract to repair the stairs in 
21 this matter was signed on -- by the contractor on April 22nd, two 
22 days after my wife fell. 
23 THE COURT: To repair the stair, that meaning what? 
24 They replace the treads or something? 
25 MR. FOX: They rebuilt the stairs. 
-21-
1 THE COURT: They rebuilt9 
2 MR. FOX: They tore down the stairway and put a cap --
3 what they call a cap on it. They capped the stairs, added treads 
4 and handrails. 
5 THE COURT: In the interim did they maintain the stairs9 
6 MR. FOX* I think there will be some evidence from the 
7 defendant that they did make some repairs on the stairs. With 
8 respect to the duty and breach issue is we'll -- the plaintiff 
9 has — or the defendant has admitted that they didn't give any 
10 notice as to the defective condition of the stairs. 
11 THE COURT: I don't understand that statement. The 
12 defendant has admitted what? 
13 MR. FOX: In request for admissions the defendant 
14 admitted that no notice was given to Mrs. Fox regarding the 
15 defective condition of the stairs. That was well known by the 
16 defendant. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. That was my question. The defective 
18 condition which was well known is established by what testimony? 
19 MR. FOX: It will be by the fact that they were -- first 
20 of all, the condition of the stairs when she fell, or the 
21 photographs I have. Also the fact that the defendant knew — 
22 THE COURT: Well, that didn't put them on notice. 
23 MR. FOX: No, but what put them on notice was eight 
24 months earlier one of their employees fell on the stairs, tripped 
25 on a metal nosing and fell. That put them on notice, and at that 
-22-
1 point the process began to repla -- to repair the stairway m 
2 total, to tear it down, recap it, whatever -- and they eventually 
3 decided to recap the stairway — what they call a recap, which is 
4 they poured another layer of concrete over the steps and replaced 
5 the metal nosings and added handrails that weren't there before. 
6 THE COURT: I see. 
7 MR, FOX: So I believe that's notice to the defendant 
8 that the stairways were defective. Whether or not they acted 
9 reasonably, that's a question the Court will have to decide. It 
10 took them eight months to actually do the work. After my wife 
11 fell it only took them two weeks to perform the actual work, or 
12 to begin the actual work. 
13 THE COURT: Your position is that she slipped, fell and 
14 broke her leg? 
15 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
16 THE COURT: And her health condition has to do with the 
17 bone structure of her leg9 
18 MR. FOX: There will be no evidence on her preexisting 
19 condition, your Honor. As far as I know there's no one competent 
20 to testify regarding that. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, but is that fact then I'm hearing as 
22 described in the medical records, is that where it comes from? 
23 MR. FOX: No. The doctors who examined her didn't 
24 examine her with respect to her preexisting condition. 



























MR. FOX: Oh, I'm sorr>. 
THE COURT: — where -- what's the source of this 
condition that's been described9 
MR. FOX: A year before Mrs. Fox fell -- approximately a 
year before Mrs. Fox fell both she and I went to a doctor. I had 
a problem with my knee; it was giving me some problems. She had 
wanted to have her knee checked out. X-rays were taken of both 
our knees. We went at the same time, so it was a family thing, I 
guess. Anyway --
THE COURT: Well, at our age knees are a problem. 
MR. FOX: Yeah. The doctor told her at that time that 
she had some osteoarthritis in her right knee. 
THE COURT: Her knee, not her leg bone? 
MR. FOX: No, not her leg bone, in her knee. It was --
there was some missing cartilage in the knee. Partially -- there 
was some partial cartilage missing. 
THE COURT: Okay. I see. 
MR. FOX: But he didn't restrict her activities or ask 
her to -- or gave her any prescription medicine or anything like 
that. He just simply said that sometime in the future her knee 
would probably have to be replaced. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you take the position her knee was 
not unstable. 
MR. FOX: I think the evidence will show that she 
worked, she had a — she worked at a manual labor 30b that 
-24-
1 requirea her 10 carry heavy things, ana her knee didn't give her 
2 any problem. She exercised regularly. She --
3 THE COURT: But we don't have an expert that will speak 
4 I on that subject? 
5 MR. FOX: There will be no medical testimony, your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: I see. Okay. Anything else? 
8 MR. FOX: No, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you for your efforts. 
10 Mr. Seller? 
11 MR. SEILER: Thank you, your Honor. One of the things 
12 that the plaintiffs allege is that they will not have anyone 
13 testify about whether or not any treatment that Mrs. Fox received 
14 was reasonable and necessary. As to damages, Mrs. Fox is 
15 incapable of testifying as to whether or not those medical 
16 services were reasonable and necessary. She simply has no 
17 expertise at all. She could not testify indeed that her bone was 
18 broken. The bone didn't protrude out through the arm — or 
19 through the leg, I'm sorry. There's no testimony about that. 
20 She went to the hospital with a leg that hurt and was large and 
21 she came out with a fixator. She was presumably sedated when the 
22 fixator was attached. For whatever reason the fixator may have 
23 been attached, we don't know what that reason was. 
24 We indeed have no testimony therefore that the arm is — 
25 or that the leg was broken. I presumed that they would have — 
-25-
1 you know, they identified some of the doctors as witnesses and I 
2 figured they'd bring them. If they don't bring their doctors how 
3 in the world are they going to say -- how is the Court going to 
4 know what happened with that knee? 
5 THE COURT: How -- what was the defense intention about 
6 these medical records? You made reference in your motion --
7 MR. SEILER: Sure. 
8 THE COURT: — to these records. Are you going to put 
9 these records in? 
10 MR. SEILER: Well, we may run out and subpoena those 
11 doctors if we have to, your Honor. If they intend to close their 
12 case without having anyone testify that any treatment that she 
13 got was reasonable and necessary how is there any damage? How 
14 can there be any damage? 
15 THE COURT: Well, I understand that. But that aside --
16 I'm speaking also of causation --
17 MR. SEILER: Sure. 
18 THE COURT: — and I understood your motion relied upon 
19 this alternative medical condition proposition. How is that 
20 established? 
21 MR. SEILER: We'll end up — right now apparently we 
22 won't have them in the plaintiff's case, so we'll end up 
23 subpoenaing Dr. Faux and Dr. Murdoch if the Court -- if the 
24 plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss at the end of the 










































-- we h 
imony. We don't 
than you can sa 
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Have you identified these medical records? 
Yes. 
In your — you have9 
Yes. 
All right. 
Without objection. So we have -- you know, 
ave an injury to which there is no causation 
know what caused that at this pomt, any 
y, "When I fell my side hurt and after that 





















Let me see if I can get the record 
t know if we've got a dispute about this 





This seems to turn on the law 








Both as to the defect in the 
The medical --
— as to whatever — 
The treatment. 
-- medical treatment she may 
law. 
not so much on 
an expert to 
stair, if any, 
have received. 
All right. If I can interrupt you, Mr. Fox, 































on. You take the position, 
— Ms . Fox will testify as 
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Yes. 
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Fox and Faux. 




















he received and pai 
dispute, then, 
in this trial 
rdoch. 










THE COURT: Okay. But he treated her. I would assume 
those medical records would come in on his testimony relative to 
treatment. Is that true9 
MR. FOX: That's possible. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. FOX: If the records come in I don't see how it's 
going to aid — 
THE COURT: Do I have to hear this testimony to get to 
that, though? 
MR. FOX: First of all, he wasn't identified as an 
























































these medical records are 






foundation. This is just a 
comes in and testifies, what's he 
g to say, "I treated Mrs. Fox 
not. 
not — 
' t say that. 
not asking that. 
really 
going 
asking is it conceivable that 1 
to be received by this Court? 
It's not going to happen, your Honor. Well, 














this case, then, to 
cal records? I'm on 
be dispositive 














>. I will say that. But we're 
the use of any medical records. I 
, my question is this. Do I need to 
see if I'm going to receive these 




to turn on whether I receive the 
. I'm wondering. 



























THE COURT: That's my question. 
MR. FOX: -- it's a factual issue whether or not you 
receive the medical records? 
THE COURT: No, my question — 




























this case. Is that what you want to hear? 
That's what I wanted -- well, 
I know, you want to know --
-- just want to know --
-- what our position is. 
-- what your position is. 
That's our position. 
I see. What is the basis for 
not what I 
that? 
Well, first of all, we don't have a witness to 














s. If they 
MR. FOX: 
sclosure; I 
when we ex 
I to those medical records. 
defense to 
All right. Which would be, what, custodian? 
It could be a custodian. They didn't identify 
doctors. 
All right. They told me they 
have not I guess I need to look 
Well, they have — they put the 
won't deny that. The documents 





were in their 
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1 exhibits. 
2 THE COURT: All right. This xS my question, then. 
3 Is — tell me where I'm wrong. It seems conceivable they've 
4 designated the documents as an exhibit I would allow a custodian 
5 to give foundation as to the medical records. Where upon I would 
6 expect I would probably receive these medical records. Is it 
7 unfair to presume such for purposes of this discussion on this 
8 motion? 
9 MR. FOX: The problem with that I foresee is that the 
10 medical records contain conclusions that there will be no 
11 foundation. 
12 THE COURT: Admittedly they would. 
13 MR. FOX: So that's the only — 
14 THE COURT: But they are what they are, and the parties 
15 can bring in evidence and testimony regarding the content of the 
16 records. That's what trials are about. But those records would 
17 be before me, and that's why I'm asking. I don't know why -- if 
18 I have to -- otherwise I've got to do this. I'll defer this 
19 motion and ask you to bring m the custodian and we'll hear the 
20 testimony and see if the records come in or not. That's what 
21 I'll do. Then I can address the motion. 
22 MR. SEILER: Your Honor, may I — we may not have to go 
23 there. 
24 THE COURT: Well, that's — I know, but this is an 





























































I understand mat . 
-- it's part of the J discussion of w 
such and so. You suggest this base 
pute it admittedly. 
Your Honor, can I 
All right. You've 
object to --
-- Mr. Seller. 
- the records, your 
-- may I just — 
objected to the 
Honor. 
Go ahead, Mr. Seller. 
Your Honor, I thir 
ical records in the 
I understand that. 
If there are no me 
chief how do you get 
nd necessary --
I understood that, 
r theory that it clearly was her 
before me? 








-- we al 
It probably isn't 
That's my question. 
— the doctor, and 
ready have plaintiff 
Lk we've learned 
plaintiff's case 
dical records in 
any evidence in 
but my question 
condition. How 
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they're not going to 
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put m any testimony about what the 
're not going to say one thing about whether 
jdical record — or whe 
latever it is that she 
necessary. Maybe what they should 
on her and sent her 
THE 
MR. 









sometimes I think I 
explain it very well 
THE COURT: 









You know, so 
w they can ever 
I do. 
Okay. I just 
understand some 
No, but that's 
Right. What 
Well, that isn 
ther or not the medical 
received, was reasonable and 
have done is put an ice pack 
if there is no such testimony 
prove the damage. You see 
want to make sure I wasn't --
thing so well that I don't 
part of it and this condition 
was her condition9 Was her 
't established by -- I agree 
the cause of the breaking of the bone might relate 





is described in 
Exactly. 
That's why I'm 
records might be coming in or not. 
MR. SEILER: So -- but we 
the medical records. | 
wondering whether the medical 
do have the other causation 
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1 issue, your Honor, and that is what was the condition of the 
2 stairs. 
3 THE COURT: (Jh-huh. 
4 I MR. SEILER: We have Mrs. Fox saying she doesn't know 
5 the location where she fell. If she doesn't know the location of 
6 where she fell, how can she say what's wrong with it? 
7 Furthermore, her testimony in her deposition was to the effect 
8 that she went down the stairs -- or as she went up the stairs she 
9 heard some clinking. As she came down the stairs she saw her 
10 foot slide out. It doesn't say that she saw that there was some 
11 defect. So if she can't --
12 THE COURT: The testimony is that she heard the clinking 
13 of the tread going up? 
14 MR. SEILER: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: But not coming down? 
16 MR. SEILER: I'm not sure if she says that coming down 
17 or not, your Honor. I'd have to go back and look at her 
18 deposition, to be candid with the Court as I try to be. But my 
19 point is, your Honor, how do we know what the reasonable repair 
20 system is, what was damaged at the time on the stairs? We don't 
21 know that. If he can't know that how can he go forward? 
22 We have no expert that says this is how you're supposed 
23 to repair the stairs, this is when you're supposed to repair 
































' THE COURT: 
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are defective? 
I don't think 
-34- j 
neralized one tnar the stairs 
put on notice eight months 
that that's even close, your 
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THE COURT: 
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I better look 
Would you? 
Before I spea 
All right. 
ical records but 
, your Honor, be 
k out of turn. 
kind of 
will say to 
program nor 
(inaudible). 
k to the 
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1 (Counsel confers with Mr. Thomas) 
2 THE COURT: I notice, Mr. Fox, while he's looking that 
3 you have designated Dr. Faux as a witness. Did you not intend to 
4 call him? 
5 MR. FOX: We had designated him as a witness, but m 
6 view of the fact that the defense had not identified any experts, 
7 nor had they identified any custodian for medical records, we 
8 decided not to call him as a witness. 
9 THE COURT: I see. 
10 MR. SEILER: I'm having trouble finding this pleading, 
11 your Honor. I'm sorry. 
12 THE COURT: That's all right. Do you want to take a 
13 brief minute recess to look? 
14 MR. SEILER: If that wouldn't offend the Court any. 
15 THE COURT: That would be fine. We'll take a recess and 
16 I'll consider your pleadings while we're waiting. 
17 MR. SEILER: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: I think I'll reread some of this. Thank 
19 you. 
20 MR. FOX: You're welcome. 
21 COURT BAILIFF: All rise. 
22 (Short recess taken) 
23 COURT BAILIFF: This Court is again m session. 
24 THE COURT: Please be seated. I'll note for the record 
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1 MR. SEILER Yes, but that does not include Dr Faux on 
2 this list. I don't want the Court to be misled aboat that. But 
3 it does -- he is included on the plaintiff's witness list for 
4 trial as one that is expected to be called, and reasonably we 
5 should. 
6 THE COURT: I see. Okay. All right. Let me ask you 
7 this question. I'm of the mind — I believe that this motion has 
8 critical aspects to the substantial issues of the case, and I 
9 understand your position. I'm also concerned about these medical 
10 records as to how it may affect this motion. Therefore, the 
11 Court would exercise its discretion to allow the calling of a 
12 custodian of the records. Presumably if that custodian were 
13 called that person would come m and say, "Yes, Utah Valley 
14 Regional Medical Center keeps records -- medical records in the 
15 regular course of their business." 
16 I assume, Mr. Fox, that you objected to the medical 
17 records because there's not designated custodian; is that true9 
18 MR. FOX: Also to the information contained in the 
19 medical records. First of all, the medical records won't --
20 didn't -- do not diagnose Mrs. Fox's preexisting condition. 
21 THE COURT: They don't what? 
22 MR. FOX: They don't diagnose her preexisting condition. 
23 There's no information in there on that. 
24 THE COURT: I'm not speaking to that. I'm speaking to 
25 the admissibility of these records and what your objection would 
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1 be about the records, which seemingly would come in witn a 
2 custodian. Are you --
3 MR. FOX: They did not identify a custodian. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, this is my question now. 
5 MR. FOX: Okay. For the Court's information, if the 
6 Court will check the record, we did subpoena Dr. Faux but decided 
7 not to bring him because there was no -- because the defense did 
8 not designate a custodian or a doctor. 
9 THE COURT: Because of what? 
10 MR. FOX: Because they did not designate a custodian or 
11 a doctor and there was no way they could bring m medical 
12 records. So that's why we didn't --
13 THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. 
14 MR. FOX: We released Dr. Faux from that subpoena. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Back to my question, 
16 then. If the custodian were called, presumably the custodian 
17 could lay foundation for the admission of these records. What 
18 would your objection be? 
19 MR. FOX: My objection would — well, as far as the 
20 custodian is concerned, the only objection we would have is that 
21 the custodian was not identified in pre-trial disclosures, and we 
22 prepared our case on that basis, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. That's what I assumed would be your 
24 objection. 
25 MR. FOX: Yes. 
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1 I THE COURT: You object to tne calling of a custodian 
2 because a custodian was not identified. 
3 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
4 THE COURT: I think that's what I said. Is that your 
5 objection? 
6 MR. FOX: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: So your objection is over the course 
8 discretion to allow the calling of a custodian. 
9 MR. FOX: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Would you have any other 
11 objection? 
12 MR. FOX: Well, I have an objection to the records 
13 themselves because if you're going to call the custodian, the 
14 custodian of the -- it depends on which records we're talking 
15 about, the --
16 THE COURT: Let me put it --
17 MR. FOX: -- hospital records or we're talking about 
18 Dr. Faux's records. We'd talk about two separate custodians. 
19 THE COURT: I guess I understood them to be the same. 
20 Are they different? 
21 MR. FOX: They're different. 
22 MR. SEILER: There are — the records we would ask the 
23 custodian to testify about are from IHC, and they are on the date 
24 of the injury. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. These are the hospital records. 
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1 1 MR. FOX: Well, than makes it incomplete, your Honor, 
2 because tnen that puts --
3 THE COURT: I'm only looking for what they're relying 
4 on They identify them as those hospital records. I don't know 
5 what they are. 
6 MR. FOX: Well, the problem is the content of the 
7 record. The content of the record may or may not be the result 
8 of the doctor's examination. Dr. Murdoch was not the treating 
9 physician. 
10 THE COURT: I'm not getting into that. Okay, this is my 
11 question, then. I'm going to defer this case and allow — we'll 
12 take a recess and I'll allow you to go get your custodian, 
13 Mr. Seller. I'm interested to know if these records are coming 
14 in. I'm simply asking you whether you're going to object to the 
15 admission of these records --
16 MR. FOX: I will. 
17 THE COURT: — based on foundation. 
18 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
19 THE COURT: So if I call this custodian ~ 
20 MR. FOX: And then he establishes — 
21 THE COURT: — you don't think this custodian is going 
22 to answer that question did they keep these records m the 
23 regular course — 
24 MR. FOX: I'm sure they will. 
25 THE COURT: And would they not then be admitted? 
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1 I MR. FOX: The only other objection we'd have is that 
2 they contain information of an injured person's statement that's 
3 not admissible. That would be our other reservation. 
4 THE COURT: Well, the records are going to be m and 
5 you're going to dispute what they -- I assume you dispute that 
6 she even made those statements. 
7 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
8 THE COURT: But those are contained in a history, and 
9 they would be part of the medical record that you dispute. Is 
10 that not true? I'm not trying to quarrel with you about it, I'm 
11 just trying to understand --
12 MR. FOX: I understand what you're saying. If you're 
13 going to allow them to establish a foundation for admitting the 
14 medical records — 
15 THE COURT: Yeah, based on a custodian, because I don't 
16 view a custodian --
17 MR. FOX: — then that's the Court's discretion and I 
18 accept that. The Court is well aware of the objection that we'll 
19 make. 
20 THE COURT: That's what I'm trying to do is make a 
21 record of your objection. 
22 MR. FOX: That's fine. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. FOX: And that's our objection. 
25 THE COURT: Do you need to require this? Do you want me 
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1 to defer this and get this casiodian or can you stipulate to 
2 that? 
3 MR. FOX: Well, now you're taking — 
4 THE COURT: That's what I'm asking you. 
5 MR. FOX: No. I think that the custodian should come --
6 THE COURT: I'll defer it, then. 
7 MR. FOX: Okay. I think the custodian -- so we can 
8 examine the custodian on foundation. 
9 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to do this because I 
10 think it's efficient as to this case. It may determine where 
11 this case goes. 
12 MR. FOX: And I'm not arguing at all with the Court in 
13 that regard. 
14 THE COURT: But just — but some people can make 
15 stipulations and some cannot. I understand that. I'm just 
16 simply asking. 
17 MR. FOX: We would not stipulate to the foundation. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Then we're going to take a 
19 recess. Mr. Seller, I'm going to direct that you seek out a 
20 custodian for the medical records. When you're ready we'll 
21 resume with that custodian. 
22 MR. SEILER: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 MR. FOX: So will he — 
24 THE COURT: We'll do it now. 
25 MR. FOX: I assume that's going to take some time. 
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1 THE COURT: Yes. We're going to take a recess for that. 
2 MR. FOX: So should we stay here this morning or we come 
3 back9 How do you want to handle that9 
4 THE COURT: You can — I'll take a recess and you can 
5 advise me when you're ready. I assume it could be done within an 
6 hour or two and he' 11 -- you can communicate as to what you think 
7 you should do in that interim. You can leave your materials. 
8 MR. SEILER: Thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 COURT BAILIFF: All rise. This Court is in recess. 
11 (Recess taken) 
12 COURT BAILIFF: We're again in session. 
13 THE COURT: Please be seated. My clerk advises me that 
14 you had some discussion. 
15 MR. SEILER: Yes, your Honor. We have had some 
16 discussion and have determined that we simply won't offer those 
17 medical records. We do have witnesses as to the Emergency 
18 Medical Service people who have the same -- for our purposes the 
19 same information, that is that she said that her leg went out 
20 from underneath her. 
21 THE COURT: Well, no, the purpose and intent of my 
22 discussion is to be able to make a decision on this motion 
23 knowing what the record is. What is the record? 
24 MR. SEILER: I think the record is is that the two 
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1 knee gave out ana she fell down one srair." In both cases the --
2 THE COURT: Both reports from Mr. Converse9 
3 MR. SEILER: Yes. Mr. Converse supervised Mr. Starr, 
4 who will be here to testify, and is on our witness list. He 
5 supervised Mr. Starr as he wrote this, told him generally what to 
6 write, the handwritten one. 
7 THE COURT: Just follow my questions for a minute. 
8 MR. SEILER: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: I don't mean to confuse the matter — 
10 MR. SEILER: No. 
11 THE COURT: — or make it complicated, but I just want 
12 to understand the record. Mr. Converse has — he would lay the 
13 foundation for this report? 
14 MR. SEILER: For each of them. There are — 
15 THE COURT: Of the two reports? 
16 MR. SEILER: Yeah. There's one that's handwritten, 
17 there's one that's dictated, as with Mr. Starr. 
18 THE COURT: And he was the — 
19 MR. SEILER: Emergency Medical Service — 
20 THE COURT: — EMT that responded? 
21 MR. SEILER: Right. They're volunteers. 
22 THE COURT: And you deposed him? 
23 MR. SEILER: Yes, pursuant to the Court's order. 
24 THE COURT: And this is a designated witness and this is 
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I have a copy of the statute, too, 
THE COURT: Could I ask you another question 
interrupting you? Is her arthritic condition before the Court? 
MR. SEILER: It is. 
MR. FOX: Well — no, it isn't. 
MR. SEILER: It is in this sense. She testified that 
she had one and it's in her deposition. 
THE COURT: She testified to what? 
MR. SEILER: That she had an artheoarthritic condition 
of her leg. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. SEILER: Or knee. 
3 THE COURT: She doesn't dispute her condition9 
4 MR. SEILER: Excuse me9 
5 THE COURT: She does not dispute her condition? 
6 MR. SEILER: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
8 MR. SEILER: Okay. So we have a statute that says --
9 and I've given the Court a copy of it -- 78-27-33, statement of 
10 an injured person. It says, ''Excepted otherwise provided in this 
11 Act any statement, either written or oral, obtained from an 
12 injured person within 15 days of an occurrence or while this 
13 person was confined m a hospital or sanitarium as a result of 
14 injuries sustained m the occurrence which statement is obtained 
15 by a person whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to 
16 the injured person, except a peace officer, shall not be 
17 admissible as evidence m any civil proceeding brought by or 
18 against the injured person for damages sustained unless/' and 
19 there's some exceptions there. I don't believe the exception 
20 portions apply. 
21 So we have two different things to talk about, your 
22 Honor. One is how is the volunteer Emergency Medical Service 
23 personnel's interest adverse to Mrs. Fox. It is not adverse. If 
24 there was potentially a malpractice claim that time has come and 
25 gone as it happened m April of 2004. It's a two-year statute. 
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1 The second question is how is this -- how can --
2 THE COURT: Who did Mr. Converse work for? 
3 MR. SEILER: He didn't work for anybody. He was a 
4 volunteer for Brigham Young Univ -- for the Emergency Medical 
5 Service team at BYU, but there's no employment. 
6 THE COURT: Well, is he a volunteer employee? 
7 MR. SEILER: Not a employee, he's a volunteer volunteer. 
8 THE COURT: Is he a voluntary agent of BYU? Is he 
9 adverse because he's a volunteer agent? 
10 MR. SEILER: No, he's not an agent, your Honor. He's 
11 simply a person that volunteers his time and goes to scenes when 
12 he's told to go. You tell them that there's somebody injured and 
13 he shows up. He drives a van that is provided for --
14 THE COURT: Is it --
15 MR. SEILER: Excuse me. 
16 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
17 MR. SEILER: That BYU provides. So the first question 
18 is is how is Mr. Converse or Mr. Starr adverse to the plaintiff? 
19 His interests are not adverse. The statement simply isn't given 
20 to somebody that's adverse. Secondly, your Honor, the — 
21 THE COURT: Well, what's his position? He seems like an 
22 agent of BYU. Why isn't he an agent of BYU? 
23 MR. SEILER: Because he's a volunteer, your Honor. He 
24 doesn't have any --
25 THE COURT: A volunteer doesn't mean he's not an agent. 
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1 MR. SEILER: Well, he aoesn't have any relationship witn 
2 BYU other -- well, he was a student, but other than --
3 THE COURT: I mean he's authorized to do this even as a 
4 volunteer. He can't just go in there without their approval. 
5 He's seemingly -- he's not working for their benefit or their 
6 behest or -- he's implemented by them. Why isn't he an agent? 
7 J MR. SEILER: Because all he does, your Honor, is 
8 volunteer his time. 
9 THE COURT: Well, I understand that he volunteers his 
10 time. I understand he's a volunteer. 
11 MR. SEILER: Okay. 
12 THE COURT: But it's not like he has authority to go to 
13 BYU just by a person that decides to help people. What if he 
14 were doing this by himself? Could he just go up and say, xvI'm 
15 going to be your EMT? I'll respond to all" — 
16 MR. SEILER: He could but didn't. 
17 THE COURT: No, he has to do it at their behest, doesn't 
18 he? 
19 MR. SEILER: Could but didn't. Anybody could show up 
20 and say, "I'll help." That's true. 
21 THE COURT: You mean you could decide to respond as an 
22 EMT on campus at BYU with your van to provide medical treatment 
23 for people if you chose to? 
24 MR. SEILER: That's actually true, your Honor. That's 
25 not what happened, but — 
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1 THE COURT: You could just go around and do that9 
2 MR. SEILER: The persons that are --
3 THE COURT: Well, let's suppose you could do, but the 
4 fact that he volunteers doesn't mean -- I just don't understand 
5 why he's not an agent. 
6 MR. SEILER: Okay. Again, your Honor, it's a volunteer 
7 position. It is like if -- if he didn't want to go on a shift 
8 there's no consequence. If he just didn't show up there's no 
9 consequence to him. 
10 THE COURT: But if he does, does that mean that he — 
11 okay. You don't think they direct him9 If he does show up and 
12 they do provide him with the implements you don't think he's then 
13 under their umbrella? 
14 MR. SEILER: I don't think so. 
15 THE COURT: They don't direct him9 
16 MR. SEILER: They don't direct him. They do field calls 
17 because calls will go the EMT volunteer service. It's not a 
18 police department thing, it's over at the Wilkinson Center, and 
19 they make calls and dispatch and they show up at the calls. So 
20 the Court can decide if that person is governed m some way by 
21 BYU, but the person has no adverse interest. Mr. Converse's 
22 interest is not adverse to --
23 THE COURT: Well, that's the question of an agency. He 
24 might be if he's their agent. 
25 MR. SEILER: And I understand that part of the problem. 
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1 If -- you know, frankly, I think he's okay, but I'm not -- that's 
2 not where I -- that's not the end of this discussion. This 
3 statute, however, your Honor, is simply unconstitutional. The 
4 reason it's unconstitutional is based upon Article 8 Section 4 of 
5 the Utah Constitution. 
6 Article 4 of the Utah Consti — or Article 4 Section --
7 I'm sorry, Article 8 Section 4 of the Utah Constitution says, 
8 "The Utah Supreme Court shall adopt rules and procedure -- Rules 
9 of Procedure and Evidence to be used m the courts of the state, 
10 and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The legislature 
11 may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
12 Supreme Court by a vote of two-thirds of all members of both 
13 houses of legislature. Except as otherwise provided in this 
14 Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize" -- now 
15 we're beyond where it applies. 
16 So you have the Utah Supreme Court adopting the Rules of 
17 Evidence. Then we have the Court's minute entry that discusses 
18 this matter. The first page is the fax cover sheet from the — 
19 from Pat Bartholomew of this Court, your Honor. It says, 
20 "Pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 Section 4 the 
21 Constitution of Utah as amended, the Court adopts all existing 
22 statutory Rules of Procedure and Evidence not inconsistent or 
23 superceded by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence heretofore 
24 adopted by this Court." So in 1985 after the time that the 
25 statute in question was adopted the Court says, "We'll take the 
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1 statutory rules that aren't inconsistent." According to Utah 
2 Court rules --
3 THE COURT: So you're suggesting that this declared that 
4 statute unconstitutional9 
5 MR. SEILER: Absolutely. Well, it's — the Constitution 
6 says the Supreme Court makes the Rules of Evidence. The Court 
7 adopts all of the rules not inconsistent with their own rules. 
8 THE COURT: Are you suggesting, then, that that ruling 
9 of 1985 declared that statute unconstitutional? 
10 MR. SEILER: It doesn't declare it dead on, your Honor. 
11 What it says is is that the only Rules of Evidence that remain 
12 are those that are not inconsistent with the rules adopted by the 
13 Utah Supreme Court. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Is it inconsistent9 
15 MR. SEILER: Yes, absolutely. It's inconsistent with 
16 Rule 803(4), statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
17 treatment. "Statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
18 treatment and ascribing medical history for present or past 
19 symptoms, pain or sensations or the inception, or general 
20 character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as 
21 reasonably pertinent to be — or to diagnosis or treatment are 
22 all" — they're not excluded. They're all exceptions to the 
23 hearsay rule. 
24 So then we have from the Utah Court Rules at the last 
25 sentence of the second paragraph of the document I just provided 
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1 to the Court, "Any existing statutes inconsistent with these 
2 rules, if and when these rules are adopted by the Supreme Court, 
3 will be impliedly repealed." So the Court adopts the Rules of 
4 Civil Procedure and the Court Rules indicate that the statute is 
5 repealed, the very statute that is the subject of the objection. 
6 Then in Rule 803 — let's see, I already read 803. 
7 Never mind, your Honor. Then we have the history that shows when 
8 Section 78-27-33 was adopted in 1973, if that's helpful to the 
9 Court, which would be some 12 years before the Court (inaudible). 
10 So it's my position, your Honor, that the state 
11 legislature -- this statute is unenforceable, and frankly, 
12 unconstitutional and violative of Section 8 of the Utah 
13 Constitution. 
14 THE COURT: All right. So the crux of this question, 
15 then, is the Court would have to make a decision about the 
16 admissibility of these reports of Mr. --
17 MR. SEILER: And the testimony of Mr. Converse and 
18 Mr. Starr. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Converse. Is that right? 
20 MR. SEILER: That's correct, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: I assume — I'll hear from Mr. Fox, but I 
22 assume he takes a different view; is that right9 All right. 
23 But let me make sure I understand this, Mr. Seller. Your 
2 4 motion, then, is standing on the statement that you made that you 
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1 inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence that's cited by 
2 Mr. Seller? 
3 MR. FOX: I agree that it's inconsistent with that Rule 
4 of Evidence, that's correct. 
5 THE COURT: That's the problem. 
6 MR. FOX: That's the problem. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. FOX: It is a foundational issue that a statement 
9 made by an injured person is not admissible in evidence, and what 
10 I'm — unless that person receives a copy of the statement and 
11 has — within 15 days of making the statement and has an 
12 opportunity then to disavow the statement. What I'm saying is 
13 that Section 36 indicates that the legislature enacted that in 
14 view of the Rules of Evidence. It wasn't like they ignored the 
15 Rules of Evidence; they were --
16 THE COURT: I understood that, but — 
17 MR. FOX: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: — -I guess my question is what if they say 
19 that, but the two rules are inconsistent, then I'm still left 
20 with this problem of inconsistency --
21 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
22 THE COURT: — and I've got to make a decision. 
23 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
24 THE COURT: So I'm just trying to make sure I'm with 
2 5 you. 
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1 MR. FOX: I think the Court understands the problem — 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. FOX: — and I understand it also. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. There is seemingly an inconsistency. 
5 MR. FOX: That's correct. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
7 MR. FOX: That's -- and what we have m the reports, 
8 what the evidence will show is that when we took the deposition 
9 of Mr. — 
10 MR. SEILER: Converse. 
11 MR. FOX: — Converse, I asked him what the purpose of 
12 his report was, and he said the purpose of the report was a 
13 medical/legal report. It's a medical/legal report unless 
14 something comes up with regard to the services that they render. 
15 So I believe that the report itself has the potential of 
16 being adverse. Mr. Converse testified that he was an EMT -- a 
17 licensed EMT, that he worked for the Emergency Medical Services 
18 at BYU, which is a volunteer organization, • but nevertheless an 
19 organization of BYU. That he was -- his services were voluntary, 
20 that he used BYU's truck, BYU's splint, BYU's equipment. He 
21 received the call from BYU's dispatcher. They — so I think that 
22 we can make an argument that he is an agent of BYU, and there is 
23 at least a potential for adversity m the record that he kept. 
24 * He identified the record as a medical/legal record, which applies 

































d by this --
MR. FOX: 
: So you think he's potentially adverse 
- what do you say — 
Well, he is potentially adverse and now 
















: What do you say about the other arguments 








With respect to the consti --
: You still think -- you don't 
nents, unconstitutionality, do \ 
the -- his 
-- the 
'ou have a my 
response to this? 
MR. FOX: As far as constitutionality is concerned, I 
don't have a response because I'm not prepared -- this is the 
first I've heard of this argument and so we're not prepared to 
address that at this time. As far as inconsistency, it's a 
modification of the Rules of Evidence, that's for sure, and it's 
a foundational issue, and that's our position, your Honor, on 
that. They can't admit that — the injured person's statement 
into evidence unless there is — certain foundation is 
established. We don't have that foundation. Mr. Converse in his 
aff — 



























understand what the statute says, but I don't understand what 
you're saying. He's saying, "Well, this statute has these 
things." If I understood his argument he's suggesting that the 
Supreme Court has essentially declared it unconstitutional 
because it's inconsistent with the rules that they've adopted. 





FOX: I -- that's probably his position, yes. 
COURT: And you say you're not prepared to address 
FOX: We're not prepared to address the 








COURT: And you still stand on statute? 
FOX: That's correct. 
COURT: Okay. 
FOX: And that's our position. 
COURT: All right. That helps. Thank you. 
Seller? 
SEILER: Your Honor, I believe the Supreme Court's 
ruling and the Utah Constitution is clear that if there is an 
inconsistency, which Mr. Fox has agreed with the Court there is 
one between the statute and the Rules of Evidence that the 1 
statute is ineffective. That makes it ineffective. I don't 
think there's any question. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: How is it ineffective? 
SEILER: It is ineffective because it is an attempt 
-61-
1 to -- it is inconsistent with the Rules of Evidence adopted by 
2 the Utah Supreme Court. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. I want to review that again because 
4 it turns on whether I admit this evidence or not. 
5 MR. SEILER: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: Specifically let's speak to the 
7 inconsistency. 
8 MR. SEILER: Okay. The Rules of Evidence make 
9 declarations made for medical treatment purposes admissible. 
10 This statute says it's not admissible unless certain events 
11 occur. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. SEILER: Those events aren't particularly relevant 
14 because no one argues they did occur. So you're having the state 
15 legislature pass an act in 1973, some 12 years before the Court 
16 issued its memorandum decision or it's decision that I provided 
17 to the Court in 1985, and the Court specifically says, "We — I 
18 better read it because if I don't I might misspeak. It says, 
19 "The Court adopts all existing statutory Rules of Procedure and 
20 Evidence not inconsistent or superceded by the Rules of Procedure 
21 and Evidence heretofore adopted by this Court," effective July 1, 
22 1985. 
23 So if the Supreme Court is the one that gets to adopt 
24 the Rules of Evidence and they say, "Yeah, we're going to take on 


























1 Evidence," and this 



















statute is inconsistent with the 
it not effective and not enforcea 




: Does the Court have other quest 
-62-
Rules of j 
ble, and I 
inadmissible 
ions? 
No, I just want to make sure I understand 
iscussion -- what would be incumbent upon this 
admissibility of this evidence, then. Y 
















I don't want to --
Go ahead. Go ahead. 
If the issue turns on whether it's 
, I think that's for the Judge to 







ute and the Cou 
THE COURT: 
In this case — 
-- on its face an inconsistency wi 
rt has to reconcile that inconsist 

































respect your objection, Mr. Fox, on that subject, and I 
understand you take a different view and understandably why. 
However, I am persuaded to grant the motion. I believe 
and am persuaded with Mr. Seller's arguments regarding the fact 
that the response -- that Ms. Fox, Linda Fox, cannot give 
testimony as a lay person regarding the nature, the necessity or 
the extent of her treatment and whether it was necessary and 
reasonable, or if the expenses incurred for that treatment were 
necessary or reasonable. That only an expert that is involved in 
that field can give testimony as to the reasonableness of the 
expenses incurred and the necessity of the treatment. One might 
argue that you don't apply fix -- fixating braces to knees unless 
they're necessary, but that's not something this Court can 
speculate on. It requires expertise. 
With the assumptions of the record that have been 
referred to, I'm also persuaded to grant the motion on the 
question of proximate cause. The Court notes that the record 
shows that Ms. Fox suffered from a degenerative condition in her 
knee prior to her fall at the Harmon building. I understand that 
she was advised of a future required knee replacement by her 
physician. 
The Court has, therefore, before it two plausible and 
alternative explanations as to why she fell. It is possible that 
Brigham Young University negligently maintained the stairway, and 
that that negligence created a dangerous condition that caused 
-65-
1 Mrs. Fox to fall and injure her leg. However, based on the 
2 record, it is possible to argue -- arguably it is possible that 
3 Ms. Fox had a physical condition that caused her leg to do as she 
4 described, to go out from underneath her and caused her fall --
5 her to fall or otherwise fall on well maintained stairs, or even 
6 possibly not-so-well maintained stairs. 
7 In any event, it is Mrs. Fox's burden to demonstrate the 
8 cause of her fall. Mrs. Fox is simply not in a position to offer 
9 reliable testimony that discloses the possibility that her 
10 condition could not have been the cause of her fall on the Harmon 
11 Building steps. That matter would require the testimony of a 
12 qualified medical expert who would opine as to whether a person 
13 with Ms. Fox's condition could safely negotiate a stairway. 
14 I note and I've read this case several times, the Utah 
15 Court of Appeals has noted the need for positive expert testimony 
16 to establish a causal link between the defendant's negligent act 
17 and the plaintiff's injury depends upon the nature of the injury. 
18 There must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably 
19 caused the injury. In that regard I'm unpersuaded that Utah has 
20 adopted a burden shifting theory as described by the plaintiff in 
21 the Connecticut case referred to in the opposing memorandum. 
22 In this case the issue is not so much of a post accident 
23 injury but rather the pre-accident condition that may have been 
24 the cause of her fall. Mrs. Fox presents no witness that is 
25 qualified to address this issue. In short, plaintiffs have set 
-66-
1 forth nothing to direct the Court to one or the other theory. 
2 The Court is unable to speculate as to a plausible cause for her 
3 injuries. With the burden being the plaintiffs, the Court cannot 
4 see how the plaintiff could prevail in their case without expert 
5 testimony on the subject of causation. 
6 Now I understand you take a different view of this 
7 matter, Mr. Fox, and I respect that view. This is a critical 
8 question, and I have not taken it lightly, and I believe that if 
9 the Court hears evidence as to different potential causation and 
10 then makes a decision, I am simply speculating as to the decision 
11 of what causation I'm persuaded by, and I cannot do that -- have 
12 expert testimony and that would be reversible error, in my 
13 opinion, though you take a different view. I understand that. 
14 Having said that, where does that leave us with this 
15 case? 
16 MR. FOX: Well, it sounds like the Court has made a 
17 directed verdict with respect — 
18 THE COURT: It sounds like that --
19 MR. FOX: -- with respect to causation. 
20 THE COURT: I believe that's probably true, which would 
21 be an element of negligence. 
22 MR. FOX: That's right. 
23 THE COURT: Is this case founded solely on negligence? 
24 MR. FOX: Yes. 
25 MR. SEILER: It is. 
-68-
THE COURT: Is there any other business I need to 
address? 
MR. SEILER: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Have a 
good day. 
MR. FOX: Thank you. 
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